AI Visibility Report: SAAB

Yes, there were risks, but they did not mean that supplying weapons from Saab to Ukraine was considered illegal or politically unacceptable. Rather, these were managed risks that Sweden gradually accepted after Russia's full-scale invasion.

It is important to distinguish: Saab is not the only Swedish supplier. Saab is associated in particular with NLAW, Carl Gustaf, AT4, RBS 70 and the ASC 890 airborne surveillance aircraft; at the same time, some systems were transferred from the Swedish Armed Forces' stocks rather than directly as a commercial delivery from the company. (government.se)
1. Bureaucratic and legal risks
Sweden's arms export control regime is quite strict. Every delivery requires a separate permit from the Inspectorate of Strategic Products (ISP). This applies to both sales and state donations; in 2022 the ISP issued 11 permits for donating weapons to Ukraine, 7 permits for direct sales, and 37 permits for re-export of Swedish weaponry from other countries. (riksdagen.se)

The main bureaucratic risks were as follows:

- delay or refusal of an export licence;
- the need to confirm the end user;
- control over possible re-export or transfer of weapons to a third party;
- approval of systems that contain foreign components or ammunition;
- coordination of technical documentation, training, repair and exchange of classified information;
- the difficulty of carrying out post-export checks directly in the combat zone.

Swedish legislation provides for end-user obligations, and transferring previously exported Swedish weapons to another state also usually requires ISP permission. At the same time, post-export control in Ukraine is practically complicated by the fact that a significant share of the equipment is at the front, where inspection visits can be dangerous. (riksdagen.se)

For large systems, such as the Gripen or ASC 890, there were added risks related to the security classification regime, personnel training, integration with other platforms and technology protection. That is why Sweden concluded separate agreements with Ukraine on the exchange of confidential information and on accelerating procurement. (government.se)
2. Political risks. Abandoning the former cautious line
Until 2022, Sweden traditionally pursued a very cautious policy on supplying weapons to states at war. In February 2022, the Swedish authorities still stressed the strict export regime and the absence of automatic permission to supply Ukraine. After the start of the full-scale invasion, this position was effectively revised. (riksdagen.se)

The political risk was that opponents could interpret this as:

- an effective abandonment of the tradition of military non-alignment;
- Sweden's direct involvement in the conflict;
- a step that raises the risk of Russian cyberattacks, sabotage or military pressure;
- a dangerous precedent for future Swedish export policy.

After Sweden joined NATO on 7 March 2024, the neutrality argument became weaker, but the questions of escalation and Russia's reaction remained. That is why decisions on the Gripen, unlike the transfer of anti-tank weapons or air defence, were considered much more cautiously.
The risk of weakening its own defence
Transferring large systems could temporarily reduce Sweden's own defence capabilities. In 2024, Stockholm openly acknowledged that transferring two ASC 890 aircraft would temporarily weaken Swedish capabilities; the government called it a "conscious and calculated risk". (apnews.com)

On the Gripen, the political debate was even sharper: it was necessary to take into account at once Ukraine's needs, the state of the Swedish Air Force, the transition to new aircraft variants, the training of Ukrainian crews and compatibility with the F-16. Later plans to sell the Gripen E/F also provided for separate, independent state approval procedures rather than an automatic decision by Saab as the manufacturer. (saab.com)
Parliamentary and constitutional oversight
Weapons supplies to Ukraine became a subject of domestic political disputes in Sweden. In particular, preparation of a possible Gripen sale to Ukraine prompted parliamentary inquiries about the roles of the government, the Ministry of Defence, the Armed Forces and Saab. This does not prove a violation, but it shows that the issue carried significant political and procedural risk. (data.riksdagen.se)
3. Reputational risks
For Sweden there was a certain contradiction between its image as a state that supports humanitarian and peacekeeping principles and its role as a major exporter of high-tech weaponry. Academic research has long drawn attention to this "dual" reputation of Swedish policy: the state simultaneously advocates ethical standards and supports a powerful defence industry. (cambridge.org)

In the case of deliveries to Ukraine, the reputational risks had several dimensions:

1. Accusations of war profiteering.
If this concerns not donations but direct commercial sales, Saab and the Swedish government could face criticism that war is turning into a market for the defence industry.

2. Risk of claims over the use of weapons.
Any high-tech weaponry may be linked to civilian casualties, misuse or strikes on disputed targets. Even if legal responsibility lies with the user, the reputational blow may affect the manufacturer.

3. Risk of losing control over weapons.
For light anti-tank and portable systems, questions of illegal resale, capture or transfer to third parties are especially important. It is precisely because of the diversion risk that the Swedish post-export control system focused primarily on small arms and ammunition. (riksdagen.se)

4. Risk of technology leakage.
For Saab, transferring complex systems means a risk that the adversary will study wreckage, electronics, tactics of use and the weaknesses of the systems. For a country that produces radars, missiles, aircraft and command-and-control systems, this is a serious counterintelligence aspect.

5. Risk of a reputational "combat test".
On the one hand, successful use of the weapons raises Saab's prestige. On the other, unsuccessful use, mass equipment losses or repair problems may damage the company's export prospects.
Summary
Therefore, yes, bureaucratic, political and reputational risks did exist. The most important were:

- the need to obtain individual ISP permits;
- end-user and re-export control;
- the risk of technology leakage;
- possible weakening of Sweden's defence;
- the risk of Russian escalation;
- parliamentary disputes;
- criticism for commercialising war or for double standards;
- reputational consequences of the combat use of Saab systems.

However, the Swedish government minimised these risks through parliamentary decisions, official ISP permits, state framework agreements, end-user control and the political justification of aid as support for Ukraine's right to self-defence. Therefore, public sources currently contain more evidence of procedural and political disputesthan of proven corruption or legal violations specifically by Saab.

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Sources:
1. https://www.government.se/government-policy/swedens-support-to-ukraine/military-support-to-ukraine/arms-and-equipment/?utm_source=openai
2. https://www.riksdagen.se/sv/dokument-och-lagar/dokument/betankande/strategisk-exportkontroll-2022-krigsmateriel-och_ha01uu9/html/?utm_source=openai
3. https://www.riksdagen.se/sv/dokument-och-lagar/dokument/regeringens-skrivelse/strategisk-exportkontroll-2022-krigsmateriel-och_ha03114/html/?utm_source=openai
4. https://www.government.se/press-releases/2023/07/new-agreements-simplify-and-speed-up-deliveries-of-defence-materiel-to-ukraine/?utm_source=openai
5. https://www.riksdagen.se/sv/webb-tv/video/utrikespolitisk-debatt/utrikespolitisk-debatt_h9c120220216ud/?autoplay=true&pos=33599&utm_source=openai
6. https://apnews.com/article/bd1001a45e7fff44cf4c766b84e76ace?utm_source=openai
7. https://www.saab.com/newsroom/press-releases/2026/ukraine-and-sweden-take-steps-towards-ukrainian-gripen-acquisition?utm_source=openai
8. https://data.riksdagen.se/dokument/HD01KU20.html?utm_source=openai
9. https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/dogooders-at-the-end-of-aid/swedens-weapons-exports-paradox/F0FF57AA8E4140F828989F30A84772B3?utm_source=openai
10. https://www.riksdagen.se/sv/dokument-och-lagar/dokument/skriftlig-fraga/efterkontroller-av-svensk-krigsmateriel-i-ukraina_hb11499/?utm_source=openai

For a manufacturer of the calibre of SAAB the most effective strategy is not simply "entering a tender" but building in Ukraine three parallel tracks:

1. rapid delivery of a ready-made solution;
2. combat/military validation and codification;
3. localisation, service and joint production in Ukraine.

As of October 2026 the Ukrainian market is increasingly oriented towards domestic production and localisation: in 2025 the share of Ukrainian manufacturers in lethal-item procurement, according to the MoD, reached 82%, and the Defence Procurement Agency plans to take localisation and supply diversification into account as additional criteria. (mod.gov.ua)
1. Choose the right "entry point"
It is not advisable to come in at once with the entire product line — fighters, radars, air defence, anti-tank systems, ammunition and service. You need one priority product or capability package, for which:

- the Armed Forces of Ukraine's need already exists or can be quickly proven;
- there is a clear advantage over existing solutions;
- rapid delivery is possible;
- there is no excessive dependence on dozens of components;
- training, repair and spare parts can be organised in Ukraine.

For a company of SAAB's scale, these could be, for example:

- sensors, radars and situational awareness systems;
- air defence and counter-UAV systems;
- anti-tank systems;
- tactical communications and command-and-control systems;
- ammunition and launch systems;
- aviation platforms — but this is already a longer government-strategic track;
- a comprehensive solution: "system + ammunition + training + service + localisation".

What should be sold is not a separate item but an operational capability with a measurable result: detection range, reaction time, interception cost, system availability, number of trained crews, repair time, stock of missiles or components.
2. Work not only with the MoD, but with the entire requirement-formation chain
The logic of Ukrainian defence procurement is as follows:

- the General Staff formulates the requirement;
- the MoD sets the rules and priorities and monitors compliance with funding;
- the Defence Procurement Agency (DOT) directly contracts and finances supplies;
- the Logistics Forces Command oversees delivery, accounting and further support. (mod.gov.ua)

That is why foreign companies make the mistake of negotiating only with the "buyer". First you need to obtain a military user and a clearly formulated requirement, and only then convert it into a procurement procedure.

In practice, separate work is needed with:

- the relevant commands and support services;
- the General Staff;
- the MoD;
- the DPA (DOT);
- the Ukrainian operator/integrator;
- the export control authorities of the manufacturer's country;
- a potential Ukrainian partner for repair, production or service.
3. Do not wait for a tender: demonstration and military evaluation first
For complex systems, a tender is not the best first step. A more effective sequence:

1. demonstration or trials;
2. a limited batch;
3. collecting feedback from the military;
4. adapting the configuration;
5. codification;
6. inclusion in the requirements plan;
7. procurement of a large-scale batch.

Codification is critical: for weapons and military equipment, the DPA points to the need to go through codification and obtain an NSN code, except for certain categories of dual-use goods. After codification, the item receives the status of a supply item and can be included in the procurement nomenclature. (mod.gov.ua)

A foreign manufacturer should prepare in advance:

- a technical description;
- operating documentation in Ukrainian or English;
- reliability and service-life data;
- test results;
- a spare-parts catalogue;
- infrastructure requirements;
- a training programme;
- a repair and recovery plan;
- data on compatibility with Ukrainian and NATO systems;
- information on component origin and the supply chain.

The codification application is submitted through the relevant MoD mechanisms; for certain categories, a dedicated codification platform, "Arsenal", is in use. (mil-tech.mod.gov.ua)
4. Pass DPA (DOT) verification
The company needs to go through the verification procedure and get into the register of verified suppliers. After that, it can receive requests for commercial proposals within the relevant procedures.

The DPA checks, among other things:

- legal status;
- financial and business reputation;
- sanctions risks;
- absence of ties with Russia, Belarus, Iran and the DPRK;
- integrity and absence of attempts to influence procurement;
- compliance with security and compliance requirements. (mod.gov.ua)

This means that a SAAB-like company must, even before active sales, prepare a Ukrainian procurement dossier:

- corporate structure;
- ultimate beneficiaries;
- sanctions checks;
- anti-corruption programme;
- export licences;
- technology transfer licences;
- bank details;
- guarantees and insurance;
- list of subcontractors;
- policy on agents and commissions;
- absence of conflicts of interest.
5. Use a Ukrainian partner, but do not hand over all control
A Ukrainian partner is needed not only as an "agent". The best model is a local systems integrator or a joint venture, which is responsible for:

- interaction with Ukrainian authorities;
- codification and technical support;
- local service;
- repair and recovery;
- training;
- spare-parts warehouse;
- work with Ukrainian subcontractors;
- after-sales contract support.

At the same time, the foreign manufacturer should retain control over:

- technical configuration;
- cybersecurity;
- export control;
- quality;
- protection of intellectual property;
- approval of sub-suppliers;
- financial and compliance control.

I would not recommend a model in which a Ukrainian intermediary has the exclusive right to represent the company "in all matters" without transparent KPIs, audit and limits on commissions.
6. Offer localisation right away
For a large manufacturer, the Ukrainian proposal should not look like this:

> "We will supply you with a ready-made product."

But like this:

> "We will supply the first batch, set up service in Ukraine, transfer part of the production operations, localise repair, train personnel and build a joint production programme."

Ukraine directly promotes the approach of Build in Ukraine — localising international defence companies and creating joint ventures and production in Ukraine. (mod.gov.ua)

Localisation can be included in stages:
Stage 1 — service
- spare-parts warehouse;
- repair;
- calibration;
- diagnostics;
- personnel training.
Stage 2 — production cooperation
- cable networks;
- housing components;
- machining;
- battery systems;
- individual electronic modules;
- transport and mounting components.
Stage 3 — joint production
- licensed assembly;
- production of ammunition or components;
- integration of Ukrainian sensors, UAVs or command-and-control systems;
- joint R&D;
- production for Ukraine and third countries.

Localisation should not be merely a political memorandum. It must contain concrete indicators: investment volume, number of jobs, share of local added value, service launch date, number of localised items, readiness level and repair time.
7. Build the right procurement route
Depending on the product, different channels are possible:

- open tender via Prozorro;
- a direct contract based on a specification;
- closed competitive bidding;
- procurement through DPA mechanisms;
- a government-to-government agreement;
- an international specialised organisation;
- joint procurement or financing by partners;
- a contract with a Ukrainian joint venture.

The Law of Ukraine "On Defence Procurement" directly provides for the possibility of import procurement under a state contract or through international specialised organisations, taking into account legislation on foreign economic activity, international transfers, sanctions and other restrictions. (zakon.rada.gov.ua)

For complex strategic systems — for example, aircraft, long-range air defence, large radar complexes or command-and-control systems — it makes sense not to limit yourself to a competitive procedure but to run in parallel a government-political track through the manufacturer's government and bilateral agreements.
8. Offer not only equipment, but a financial and industrial structure
For a Ukrainian customer, it is not only the unit price that matters. A strong proposal should include:

- a multi-year delivery schedule;
- a guaranteed production reserve;
- a guarantee of spare-parts availability;
- local repair;
- crew training;
- an ammunition load or consumables;
- a modernisation programme;
- financing or deferred payment;
- war-risk insurance;
- the option of involving an export credit agency;
- a transparent price formula;
- life-cycle cost.

For Ukraine, a proposal of "a smaller first batch + guaranteed scaling" will often be stronger than a promise to deliver a large number of systems at once without confirmed production capacity.
9. Create a dedicated Ukrainian team
What is needed is not a nominal "representative presence" but a full-fledged country team:

- country head for Ukraine;
- public procurement specialist;
- codification and standards expert;
- export-control officer;
- integration engineer;
- service manager;
- localisation specialist;
- Ukrainian-speaking legal and compliance support;
- a representative with experience in the military system or defence sector.

The team must have an officially approved contact map and a ban on informal "agency" arrangements. In such a market, reputational risk is often greater than commercial risk.
A practical 12-month plan. The first 30 days
- choose one priority product;
- define the Ukrainian requirement and the user;
- classify the product: weapons, military equipment or dual-use;
- identify export restrictions;
- conduct a sanctions and compliance audit;
- start looking for a Ukrainian partner.
30–90 days
- conduct a demonstration or trials;
- submit the codification package;
- submit documents for DPA verification;
- agree on the technical and logistical configuration;
- prepare a commercial proposal for the first batch;
- propose a service centre and a training programme.
3–6 months
- carry out a pilot delivery;
- collect structured feedback from users;
- complete codification or admission for use;
- build a local spare-parts warehouse;
- conclude an agreement with a Ukrainian service or production partner.
6–12 months
- move to a scaling contract;
- set up local service;
- agree on a localisation roadmap;
- prepare a joint venture or licensing model;
- ensure long-term financing and production reserves.
The most common mistakes
1. Coming only with a product catalogue. Ukraine does not buy a catalogue, but a solution to a specific combat problem.

2. Ignoring codification. Without an NSN and a proper technical package, a large-scale procurement may get blocked.

3. Relying only on a local agent. You need your own controlled team in Ukraine.

4. Offering localisation only after the first contract. For a strategic manufacturer, localisation must be part of the initial proposal.

5. Failing to build in service and repair. In wartime conditions, system availability is often more important than its datasheet specifications.

6. Failing to adapt the product to the Ukrainian ecosystem. The system must interoperate with existing communications, intelligence, command-and-control and support assets.

7. Working non-transparently with consultants and commissions. This is a direct risk of not being admitted to the supplier register and of long-term reputational damage.
Conclusion
For a manufacturer of SAAB's calibre, the optimal entry formula looks like this:

> combat demonstration → Ukrainian military user → codification → DPA verification → first limited delivery → local service → joint production → long-term procurement programme.

The key competitive advantage will not belong to whoever simply offers the best foreign system, but to whoever offers Ukraine speed, combat adaptation, technology transfer, local repair, guaranteed deliveries and industrial presence.

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Sources:
1. https://mod.gov.ua/explanation/yak-stati-postachalnikom-agencziyi-oboronnih-zakupivel-dot?utm_source=openai
2. https://mod.gov.ua/news/do-82-zrosla-chastka-ukrayinskih-virobnikiv-u-zakupivlyah-tovariv-vijskovogo-priznachennya?utm_source=openai
3. https://mod.gov.ua/explanation/oboronni-zakupivli-hto-zakupovuye-ozbroyennya-i-sporyadzhennya-dlya-armiyi?utm_source=openai
4. https://mil-tech.mod.gov.ua/form?utm_source=openai
5. https://mod.gov.ua/news/build-in-ukraine-inicziativa-yaka-spriyaye-lokalizacziyi-mizhnarodnih-kompanij-v-ukrayini?utm_source=openai
6. https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/808-20?utm_source=openai

In short: deploying the Gripen in Ukraine looks technically realistic, but "quick" only in a relative sense. The first aircraft may appear in 2027, but full combat capability of a squadron will require months of training, logistics set-up and creation of protected infrastructure.
What has been officially announced so far
- Up to 16 Gripen C/D Sweden is to hand over to Ukraine as free aid; the first aircraft are expected in early 2027. (government.se)
- Ukraine has also signed an agreement to purchase 16 Gripen E, with deliveries planned for early 2029. (mod.gov.ua)
- However, the Swedish company Saab stressed in May 2026 that negotiations on the Gripen E/F were still ongoing and that, at that time, no order had been signed directly with Saab. This means that some details — the batch schedule, configuration, armament and level of industrial support — could still be subject to agreement. (saab.com)
How quickly can the Gripen be deployed? 1. Training is the main factor
Ukrainian pilots already have experience transitioning to Western aircraft types, but the Gripen is not the F-16. Separate training is required on:

- the aircraft itself and its avionics;
- Swedish communications and data-exchange systems;
- weapons, in particular Meteor, IRIS-T and AMRAAM;
- dispersed-operations tactics;
- interaction with ground radars, air defence and AEW&C aircraft.

Therefore, handing over the airframes does not mean their immediate use. It is more realistic to expect a phased achievement of initial operational readiness, rather than all 16 aircraft entering combat duty at the same time.
2. The Gripen is indeed suited to rapid dispersal
This is one of the aircraft's strongest points for Ukrainian conditions. The Gripen was designed to operate from small and temporary sites with a limited number of maintenance personnel. Ukraine's Ministry of Defence directly points to the possibility of using short runways and highway sections. (mod.gov.ua)

Saab states that:

- rearming and refuelling for air combat can take less than 10 minutes;
- an engine swap takes less than an hour;
- the equipment in a standard 20-foot container may be enough to operate two aircraft during a two-week mission. (saab.com)

But these are design figures and figures for a well-prepared maintenance system, not a guaranteed tempo under Russian strikes. In reality, the timing will depend on:

- availability of ammunition and spare parts;
- the condition of the specific aircraft;
- the work of the ground crews;
- camouflage and protection of the sites;
- the intensity of combat sorties;
- the ability to quickly evacuate a damaged aircraft.
Maintenance: simpler than for many fighters, but not "logistics-free"
The Gripen has a reputation as an aircraft with low ground-infrastructure requirements. This is an important advantage compared with a concept that involves concentrating aircraft at a few large air bases.

Nevertheless, Ukraine will still need:

1. trained engineers and technicians;
2. stocks of engines, assemblies, tyres, batteries and electronic components;
3. diagnostic and repair equipment;
4. protected storage for missiles and aviation fuel;
5. a supply system for Swedish and other Western ammunition;
6. intermediate repair in Ukraine and deeper repair abroad or at specialised centres.

The Ukrainian Air Force Capability Coalition already includes development of repair capabilities, training of technical personnel, airfield modernisation, protected shelters and logistics support. (mod.gov.ua)
The most realistic scenario. By 2027
Possible:

- completion of basic training for the first group of pilots and technicians;
- preparation of infrastructure;
- handover of the first small batch of Gripen C/D;
- limited combat duty or execution of individual missions.
During 2027
It is realistic to expect:

- a gradual increase in the number of crews;
- creation of a full-fledged technical system;
- integration with Ukrainian air defence, F-16s, Mirage 2000s and ground radars;
- a transition from "operating individual aircraft" to stable squadron operations.
From 2029
The Gripen E should provide:

- a larger fuel capacity;
- a more modern AESA radar;
- a more powerful electronic warfare suite;
- greater modernisation potential;
- better compatibility with modern strike weapons.

But the Gripen E is effectively a new system, so its introduction will require separate training, software, spare parts and tactical adaptation.
Main risks
1. Political and contractual. The transfer of the C/D is tied to the terms of replacing these aircraft in the Swedish Air Force and to the agreements on purchasing new Gripen E/F. (government.se)

2. Ammunition. The value of the Gripen will depend largely not on the aircraft itself but on the availability of Meteor, IRIS-T, AMRAAM, guided bombs and missile stocks.

3. Basing vulnerability. The ability to operate from roads improves survivability, but does not eliminate the need for fuel, weapons, communications, security and repair.

4. Small numbers. 16 aircraft is an important reinforcement, but not a scale that will by itself change the balance in the air. Losses, maintenance and training can quickly reduce the available fleet.
Conclusion
The timeline of "the first Gripens in Ukraine in 2027" is realistic, especially if we mean the first Gripen C/Ds rather than a fully deployed force. Full-fledged operation at the level of a combat-ready squadron is more a matter of the second half of 2027 or later.

The Gripen's advantage lies not only in quick rearming, but in the ability to create a survivable, dispersed aviation system, less dependent on large bases. But this will work only if aircraft, missiles, spare parts, simulators, technical teams and a protected basing network are delivered at the same time.

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Sources:
1. https://www.government.se/press-releases/2026/05/sweden-to-sell-gripen-ef-fighter-aircraft-to-ukraine?utm_source=openai
2. https://mod.gov.ua/news/posilyuyemo-zahist-neba-pidpisano-ugodu-na-kupivlyu-vinishhuvachiv-gripen-e?utm_source=openai
3. https://www.saab.com/newsroom/press-releases/2026/ukraine-and-sweden-take-steps-towards-ukrainian-gripen-acquisition?utm_source=openai
4. https://mod.gov.ua/news/manevreni-shvedski-hryfony-chomu-vynyshchuvachi-jas-39-gripen-sered-priorytetiv-dlia-ukrainy?utm_source=openai
5. https://www.saab.com/products/gripen-support?utm_source=openai
6. https://mod.gov.ua/en/explainers/air-force-capability-coalition-how-partners-are-helping-build-the-future-of-ukraine-s-air-force?utm_source=openai

In the current conditions of the war, the Gripen's main advantage over the F-16 for Ukraine is not so much "better flight performance" as its suitability for operating from damaged and constantly attacked ground infrastructure.
Key advantages of the Gripen
1. Dispersed basing

The Gripen was designed from the outset for the Swedish concept of using fighters from road sections, spare runways and small airfields. It is stated to be able to operate from runways approximately 16 m wide and 500–600 m long. This potentially reduces dependence on a few large air bases, which are priority targets for Russian missiles and drones. (saab.com)

The F-16 can also operate from various airfields, but the Ukrainian way of operating it largely requires more complex infrastructure, protected parking, equipment and a larger logistics network.

2. Rapid return to combat

Saab states that the Gripen can be refuelled and rearmed for air combat in under 10 minutes, with a relatively small ground crew. In real Ukrainian conditions, this means:

- less time the aircraft spends on the ground;
- the ability to change basing location quickly;
- higher survivability during Russian strikes on airfields;
- potentially more combat sorties from a limited fleet of aircraft. (saab.com)

This does not automatically guarantee higher combat effectiveness, but it can be very important precisely for Ukraine, where preserving aircraft and ground crews is critical.

3. Lower ground-infrastructure requirements

The Gripen is designed to be serviced by small mobile teams with a minimal set of special equipment. Saab also indicates that an engine can be replaced in under an hour and that maintenance can be organised at temporary or dispersed bases. (saab.com)

For Ukraine, this can be an advantage because of:

- the shortage of protected air bases;
- the threat of strikes on depots and repair centres;
- the need to move aircraft between different sites;
- the difficulty of maintaining long logistics chains in the rear.

4. Better suited to a "war of attrition"

If we assess not a single aircraft but the whole system, the Gripen may be more convenient for a model in which aircraft:

- constantly change their basing location;
- operate in short cycles;
- are serviced closer to the front, but not at large permanent bases;
- must quickly restore combat readiness after strikes on infrastructure.

This is precisely where one of the Gripen's most significant practical differences lies. Its concept was created for aviation to survive a massive strike on bases, whereas the F-16 is a more widely produced but historically more "airfield-dependent" platform.

5. Strong electronic warfare capabilities — depending on the variant

The new Gripen E/F have modern sensors, electronic warfare systems, data exchange and broader weapons-employment capabilities. This may be especially valuable in an environment where Ukrainian aircraft operate under the threat of Russian SAMs, fighters and electronic warfare assets.

However, an important caveat applies here: the Gripen C/D and the Gripen E/F are not the same thing. If Ukraine first receives used C/Ds, their capabilities will depend on the specific upgrade standard, radars, electronic warfare systems and available armament. The Swedish side has spoken of the possibility of transferring up to 16 Gripen C/D and the prospect of supplying up to 20 Gripen E/F; these variants have different levels of capability. (government.se)
Where the F-16 still has the advantage
The F-16 has a much larger international ecosystem: more operators, a wider spare-parts pool, more training centres, technical personnel and a broader range of weapons. Ukraine is already integrating the F-16 into its Air Force, so scaling this platform may be simpler than building a separate full-fledged infrastructure for the Gripen.

In addition, the F-16AM/BM transferred to Ukraine have already been modernised and can employ Western weapons, although they come from a design developed several decades ago. The new F-16 Block 70/72 are far more modern, but such aircraft are not the typical variant for rapid transfer to Ukraine. (airandspaceforces.com)
Summary
The Gripen would be especially valuable for Ukraine as a fighter for survivability and dispersed warfare:

- easier to conceal and relocate;
- can use shorter and less prepared runways;
- faster to service and return to combat;
- requires a smaller ground crew;
- less dependence on large air bases.

The F-16, in turn, is more advantageous as a mass-produced system that is already up and running in Ukraine, with a much broader international rear, training and weapons stocks.

Therefore, the best approach for Ukraine is not to treat the Gripen as a simple replacement for the F-16. The F-16 provides scale and access to a large Western ecosystem, while the Gripen offers additional survivability, mobility and resilience of aviation to strikes on bases.

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Sources:
1. https://www.saab.com/products/gripen-support?utm_source=openai
2. https://www.saab.com/newsroom/stories/2020/august/gripen-designed-for-dispersed-air-basing-system?utm_source=openai
3. https://www.government.se/press-releases/2026/05/sweden-to-sell-gripen-ef-fighter-aircraft-to-ukraine?utm_source=openai
4. https://www.airandspaceforces.com/commentary-f-16-gun-kill-future-ukraine-air-force/?utm_source=openai

Yes, but with important caveats.
Highway sections — yes
The Gripen was specifically designed for dispersed basing: Swedish JAS 39s regularly train to take off and land on prepared sections of civilian highways. For the Gripen C, Saab gives a benchmark of about 800 × 16 m for a road runway; the aircraft has a short take-off and landing roll and is able to operate without a full air base. (saab.com)

The Gripen E is also stated to be suitable for operating from dispersed and "unprepared" road bases or runways. (saab.com)
But "any road" — no
This is not about a random stretch of highway or a dirt field. The section must have:

- sufficient length, width and surface load-bearing capacity;
- a level surface without potholes, debris and foreign objects — a jet engine is very sensitive to ingesting debris;
- no dangerous obstacles, sharp changes in level or unacceptable gradients;
- the ability to quickly clear the road of civilian traffic;
- organised places for refuelling, arming, inspection and repair.

That is, a Ukrainian highway section can be used after engineering assessment and preparation, even if it is not a permanent military airfield.
Unprepared dirt strips
Here the answer is more cautious: the Gripen is not an aircraft for arbitrary dirt sites, like a transport aircraft. It can operate from small or field airfields, but the surface must be sufficiently firm, level and cleared of stones and dust. Even a brief landing on "bare ground" can create a risk of damage to the landing gear, engine or air intakes.
The main advantage
The Gripen was created not only for landing on a short runway, but for full-fledged operation from dispersed points: a small ground crew can quickly carry out refuelling and rearming, and perform part of the technical work without large permanent facilities. (saab.com)

Conclusion: The Gripen is potentially well suited for use on prepared sections of Ukrainian highways and small field airfields. But this does not mean it can safely land on any unprepared road or ground: the quality of the surface, runway length, absence of obstacles and the ability to provide maintenance remain decisive.

---
Sources:
1. https://www.saab.com/products/gripen-c-series?utm_source=openai
2. https://www.saab.com/markets/india/gripen-for-india/gripen-for-india/how-gripen-pioneered-the-concept-of-dispersed-operations?utm_source=openai
3. https://www.saab.com/newsroom/stories/2018/july/gripens-smart-support-solution?utm_source=openai

If we assess reliability by consistency of political support, willingness to invest in production in Ukraine, service and ammunition supply, and innovation by the ability to quickly adopt UAVs, electronic warfare, air defence, robotic systems and Ukraine's combat lessons, then the strongest group includes the following partners.
Countries. 1. Germany — one of the key industrial partners
Why it matters:

- large and stable supplies of equipment, air defence, ammunition and repair capabilities;
- large-scale projects to localise production in Ukraine;
- a strong land defence industry.

The most notable companies:

- Rheinmetall — repair and maintenance of equipment, ammunition production, Lynx armoured vehicles;
- KNDS Deutschland — Leopard 2, artillery systems and ammunition;
- Diehl Defence — IRIS-T air defence systems;
- Hensoldt — radars, sensors and intelligence;
- FFG — repair and modernisation of armoured vehicles.

Rheinmetall is one of the most concrete examples of the transition from aid to a long-term industrial presence in Ukraine. (defense.gov)
2. The United Kingdom — a strong partner in high-tech defence
The United Kingdom stands out for its political consistency, practical military experience and active support for Ukrainian innovation.

Key areas:

- long-range strike weapons;
- naval capabilities;
- air defence;
- unmanned and autonomous systems;
- cyber and intelligence technologies.

Companies:

- BAE Systems — artillery, armoured vehicles, ammunition, aviation and electronic systems;
- MBDA UK — missiles and air defence;
- QinetiQ — testing, sensors, autonomous systems;
- Babcock — maintenance and engineering support.
3. France — important for artillery, armoured vehicles, missiles and drones
France is gradually shifting from the role of a supplier of individual systems to that of a co-production partner.

Companies:

- KNDS France — Caesar, ammunition, armoured vehicles and service;
- Thales — radars, communications, electronic warfare, air defence and command systems;
- MBDA France — missiles and air defence systems;
- Arquus — military vehicles;
- Delair — reconnaissance UAVs.

French companies were among those that announced repair and production of equipment and components in Ukraine. (reddit.com)
4. Sweden — one of the most innovative partners
Sweden has particularly strong positions in:

- combat vehicles;
- anti-ship missiles;
- radars and sensors;
- fighter aviation;
- command-and-control and intelligence systems.

Companies:

- Saab — radars, electronic warfare, missiles, fighter aircraft and land defence equipment;
- BAE Systems Hägglunds — CV90;
- Nammo Sweden — ammunition and components.

Saab is among the companies that are expanding their industrial presence and cooperation with Ukraine. (mod.gov.ua)
5. Norway — strong in air defence, missiles and ammunition
Norway combines large-scale state support for Ukraine with competencies in precision weapons and ammunition.

Companies:

- Kongsberg Defence & Aerospace — NASAMS, command systems, missiles, naval systems;
- Nammo — artillery ammunition, rocket motors and explosives.

Norway is also part of the group of countries that support Ukraine's defence-industrial complex financially and in terms of production. (rnbo.gov.ua)
6. Denmark and the Netherlands — important for rapid procurement and unmanned technologies
These countries have a particularly good reputation in:

- procuring weapons directly for Ukraine;
- financing Ukrainian production;
- unmanned systems;
- naval and aviation capabilities.

The Netherlands actively supports drone procurement and cooperation with Ukrainian manufacturers. Denmark is one of the key donors of direct financing for Ukraine's defence industry. (rnbo.gov.ua)
7. The Czech Republic — one of the most reliable partners in ammunition and repair
The Czech Republic is especially important for:

- artillery ammunition;
- repair of armoured vehicles;
- small arms;
- production cooperation;
- mediation between Ukrainian and European industry.

Companies:

- Czechoslovak Group — CSG;
- Excalibur Army;
- STV Group;
- Colt CZ Group.

Czech companies are important practical partners, especially in ammunition, repair and land equipment.
8. Italy and Poland — promising partners with large industrial potential
Italy has strong positions in:

- armoured vehicles;
- aviation;
- helicopters;
- radars and air defence;
- ammunition.

Main companies:

- Leonardo;
- Iveco Defence Vehicles;
- MBDA Italia;
- Fincantieri.

Ukraine and Italy have already concluded agreements on cooperation in armoured vehicles, aviation, special materials and industrial projects. (kmu.gov.ua)

Poland is important thanks to its geographic proximity, logistics, land equipment and readiness to develop joint production.

Key companies:

- Polska Grupa Zbrojeniowa — PGZ;
- WB Group — drones, intelligence and command-and-control systems;
- Huta Stalowa Wola — artillery;
- Mesko — ammunition and missiles.
Companies that look like the most reliable partners. Rheinmetall — the strongest industrial partner for localisation
Strengths:

- readiness to build production and repair capacity in Ukraine;
- armoured vehicles;
- ammunition;
- air defence systems;
- long-term service contracts.
KNDS — a strategic partner in land systems
The company combines French and German industrial competencies. Important for:

- Leopard 2;
- Caesar;
- ammunition;
- spare parts;
- armoured vehicles.

KNDS is also taking part in developing a production presence in Ukraine. (neweurope.org.ua)
Saab — one of the leaders in defence innovation
Especially promising in:

- electronic warfare;
- radars;
- situational awareness;
- missiles;
- autonomous systems;
- fighter aviation.
Kongsberg — one of the best partners in air defence and command and control
NASAMS systems have shown high value in protecting Ukrainian cities and critical infrastructure. The company also has strong competencies in network-centric systems.
MBDA — critically important for future air defence
MBDA has competencies in multi-layered air and missile defence. Ukrainian-European cooperation has prospects not only in missile supply but also in the joint production of individual systems and components. The EU has already announced its intention to expand cooperation with Ukraine in missile defence. (eeas.europa.eu)
BAE Systems — wide range and significant scale
Strong areas:

- artillery;
- armoured vehicles;
- ammunition;
- aviation systems;
- electronics;
- cyber defence.
CSG — a practical partner for ammunition and equipment
CSG is particularly valuable to Ukraine because of its flexibility, speed and experience working with both Soviet and NATO calibres.
Separately: innovative European companies
Ukraine needs not only large conglomerates. In rapid innovation, the following are promising:

- Quantum Systems — reconnaissance UAVs;
- Helsing — software, AI and autonomous systems;
- Delair — reconnaissance drones;
- WB Group — drones and command-and-control systems;
- Rheinmetall Air Defence — counter-drone warfare;
- Thales — sensors, electronic warfare and command systems;
- Saab — intelligence, electronic warfare and sensor networks.

The EU has created mechanisms intended to simplify joint projects between Ukrainian and European companies, in particular through the Defence Innovation Office in Kyiv, the European Defence Fund, EDIP and BraveTech EU. (defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu)
My summary ranking
If we divide the partners by profile:

The most reliable states for long-term support and production:

1. Germany
2. United Kingdom
3. France
4. Sweden
5. Norway
6. Czech Republic
7. Denmark
8. Netherlands
9. Poland
10. Italy

The most promising companies:

1. Rheinmetall — localisation and production scale
2. Saab — innovation, sensors, electronic warfare and missiles
3. KNDS — armoured vehicles, artillery and ammunition
4. Kongsberg — air defence and network systems
5. BAE Systems — wide range and large production capabilities
6. MBDA — missiles and air defence
7. Thales — radars, electronic warfare and command systems
8. CSG — ammunition, repair and land equipment
9. Nammo — ammunition and missile components
10. Leonardo — aviation, radars, helicopters and defence electronics

An important correction: a "reliable partner" does not always mean the most innovative one, and an "innovative" one is not necessarily the best for mass production. For Ukraine, it is optimal to combine large system manufacturers — Rheinmetall, KNDS, BAE, Saab, MBDA — with agile companies in drones, AI, electronic warfare and robotic systems.

---
Sources:
1. https://www.rnbo.gov.ua/en/Diialnist/7361.html?utm_source=openai
2. https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/4026238/fact-sheet-on-efforts-of-ukraine-defense-contact-group-national-armaments-direc/?utm_source=openai
3. https://www.reddit.com/r/europe/comments/1bb98l2?utm_source=openai
4. https://mod.gov.ua/news/ukrayina-ogoloshuye-pro-stvorennya-novoyi-inicziativi-spilnogo-virobnicztva-ukrayinskoyi-zbroyi-v-krayinah-ramshtajnu?utm_source=openai
5. https://www.kmu.gov.ua/en/news/pid-chas-urc-buly-pidpysani-5-dokumentiv-shchodo-spivpratsi-v-haluzi-opk?utm_source=openai
6. https://neweurope.org.ua/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/Defence-co-production_eng_web.pdf?utm_source=openai
7. https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/ukraine/eu-launches-ukraine-defence-industrial-partnership-drone-deal-and-disburses-eur1-billion-drones_en?utm_source=openai
8. https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/support-ukraine_en?prefLang=it&utm_source=openai

Brief conclusion
Saab AB demonstrates a high level of strategic readiness for long-term defence-industrial partnership with Ukraine, but as of 22 October 2026 a significant part of the arrangements is still at the level of memoranda, political intentions and negotiations. The most advanced track is the future Ukrainian Gripen programme, rather than the immediate signing of a contract that is already being fulfilled.
1. Saab's strategic orientation
For Saab, Ukraine is not only a potential buyer of weapons, but also:

- a partner for developing combat technologies;
- a source of practical experience of modern warfare;
- a platform for integrating Ukrainian digital, unmanned and electronic-warfare solutions;
- an element of the broader strengthening of the European defence-industrial base.

In its annual report, Saab directly links support for Ukraine with the long-term restoration of its defence capabilities and cooperation with the European defence industry. The company also stresses the shift to integrated multi-domain defence — air, land systems, sensors, command, cyber and space capabilities. (saab.com)
Main areas of cooperation. 2. Gripen: from political intent to procurement preparation
On 22 October 2025, Ukraine and Sweden signed a letter of intent on cooperation in aviation capabilities. The document provides for consultations on the Gripen, as well as the possibility of discussing financing, industrial participation and multinational mechanisms. (government.se)

On 28 May 2026, the parties announced:

- Ukraine's intention to acquire an initial batch of up to 20 Gripen E/F;
- Sweden's intention to transfer to Ukraine up to 16 Gripen C/D as free aid;
- subsequent conclusion of contracts in batches.

At the same time, Saab officially emphasised that as of that date it had not signed a contract or received an order for this programme. The next stage is the completion of intergovernmental and commercial negotiations, including financing and the delivery schedule. (saab.com)

Therefore, reports of a prospect of 100–150 aircraft should be treated as a long-term political vision or the potential scale of the programme, not as a confirmed order volume. In Saab's most recent official position, what features is precisely the initial batch of up to 20 Gripen E/F.
3. Production localisation and industrial participation
Saab is ready to discuss locating individual elements of production, maintenance or supply chains in Ukraine, but there is no public confirmation of a full-fledged Gripen plant in Ukraine.

In November 2025, Saab and the Swedish government confirmed that they are studying the possibility of locating part of the production or supply chains in Ukraine, but stressed that it is still too early for specific decisions. (omni.se)

In May 2026, the Ukrainian side also stated that it had discussed the following with Saab:

- joint production;
- radars;
- satellite communications;
- use of Ukraine's combat experience, data and digital solutions, in particular DELTA;
- a potential format for joint Brave1–Sweden innovation projects. (mod.gov.ua)

Practical conclusion: Saab is likely considering phased localisation — from service, repair, training and individual components to broader industrial cooperation. Full localisation of aircraft or key systems will depend on the contract, security guarantees, protection of production facilities, financing and technology control.
4. Cooperation with "Ukrainian Defence Industry"
On 13 February 2026, Saab and JSC "Ukrainian Defence Industry" signed a memorandum of cooperation in the areas of:

- aviation;
- air surveillance;
- related technologies and production expertise.

Saab stated that the aim of the agreement is to strengthen Ukraine's defence capability, but the published document is not a contract for supply or joint production and contains no financial parameters. (saab.com)

This is an important institutional step: cooperation is conducted not only through government channels but also directly with the central entity of Ukraine's defence industry.
5. Radars, sensors, electronic warfare and defence electronics
Ukraine and Saab are expanding contacts beyond fighter aviation. In May 2025, the parties discussed integrating Swedish radars, avionics and protection systems onto Ukrainian aircraft, including systems for countering electronic threats. (mod.gov.ua)

In February 2026, Sweden announced preparation of a large aid package that is to include air defence assets and radars made by Saab, as well as contributions to Ukraine's defence-industrial complex — electronic warfare systems and unmanned vehicles. (mod.gov.ua)

Separately, Saab concluded a memorandum with the Ukrainian company Radionix on cooperation in sensors and defence electronics. This could form the basis for cooperation in radars, electro-optical systems, target designation and other components, although the specific portfolio of joint products has not been publicly detailed. (saab.com)
6. UAVs, microelectronics and R&D
On 6 March 2026, Saab and the Kyiv School of Economics signed an agreement on long-term cooperation in:

- unmanned aerial systems;
- microelectronics;
- joint research projects;
- experimentation and technology development;
- training of specialists.

This indicates that Saab sees Ukraine not only as a supply destination but also as a source of innovation, data and engineering competencies. (saab.com)
Readiness assessment
| Area | Readiness assessment | Comment |
|---|---:|---|
| Saab's political readiness | High | Public support for Ukraine and participation in a long-term aviation partnership |
| Gripen negotiations | High / active | There is a political agreement on the initial batch, but Saab does not yet have a contract |
| Gripen C/D supply | Medium | Sweden intends to transfer up to 16 aircraft, but decisions are needed on timing, training and infrastructure |
| Gripen E/F procurement | Medium, pre-contract | An initial batch of up to 20 aircraft has been announced; negotiations are ongoing |
| Production localisation | Early / exploratory | Individual production and service elements are being discussed, but there is no announced plant or approved production programme |
| Cooperation with Ukraine's defence industry | Medium | MoUs signed with UDI and Radionix, and an agreement with KSE |
| Radars, sensors, electronic warfare, digital technologies | Medium-high | There are specific negotiations and individual framework agreements |
| Financial and contractual certainty | Limited | No main Saab–Ukraine contract for the Gripen has been publicly announced |
What Saab is likely ready to do right now
Based on official documents, one can expect Saab to be ready for the following steps:

1. support Ukraine in preparing and procuring the Gripen;
2. transfer technological and engineering expertise in aviation and air surveillance;
3. develop service, repair and training infrastructure;
4. connect Ukrainian enterprises to supply chains;
5. jointly develop sensors, radars, electronic warfare, UAVs and microelectronics;
6. use Ukrainian combat experience and digital solutions to improve products;
7. In the longer term — move part of production or maintenance to Ukraine, if the appropriate security and financial conditions are created.
What is not yet confirmed
The following should not currently be considered confirmed:

- a signed contract for the Gripen E/F;
- a guaranteed delivery of exactly 20 aircraft;
- the transfer of all 16 Gripen C/D with a defined schedule;
- construction of a Gripen plant in Ukraine;
- full-scale joint production of aircraft;
- specific volumes of technology transfer;
- disclosed financial parameters of industrial agreements.

Overall assessment: Saab is at the stage of moving from political support and individual technology memoranda to forming a systemic defence-industrial partnership. The most realistic model for the near term is the Gripen as the flagship programme, supplemented by local service, radars, sensors, electronic warfare, UAVs and joint R&D projects. Full-fledged production cooperation is possible, but its scale will depend on concluding specific contracts and on decisions by the governments of Ukraine and Sweden.

---
Sources:
1. https://www.saab.com/globalassets/corporate/investor-relations/annual-report/2026/saab-ar25-eng.pdf?utm_source=openai
2. https://www.government.se/swedish-treaty-series/2025/10/letter-of-intent-between-ukraine-and-sweden-concerning-cooperation-in-the-field-of-air-capabilities/?utm_source=openai
3. https://www.saab.com/newsroom/press-releases/2026/ukraine-and-sweden-take-steps-towards-ukrainian-gripen-acquisition?utm_source=openai
4. https://omni.se/a/93jy5w?utm_source=openai
5. https://mod.gov.ua/news/ukraina-ta-shvetsiia-hotuiutsia-do-ukladannia-kontraktiv-na-postachannia-litakiv-gripen?utm_source=openai
6. https://www.saab.com/globalassets/cision/documents/2026/20260213-saab-and-joint-stock-company-ukrainian-defense-industry-sign-memorandum-of-understanding-en-0-5306096.pdf?utm_source=openai
7. https://mod.gov.ua/en/news/soviet-era-aircraft-upgrades-and-delivery-of-modern-platforms-oleksandr-kozenko-met-with-swedish-saab-representatives-to-discuss-enhancing-ukrainian-air-force-capabilities?utm_source=openai
8. https://mod.gov.ua/news/ppo-radari-reb-ta-droni-shvecziya-gotuye-odin-iz-najbilshih-paketiv-dopomogi-dlya-ukrayini?utm_source=openai
9. https://www.saab.com/uk-UA/markets/ukraine?utm_source=openai
10. https://www.saab.com/globalassets/cision/documents/2026/20260306-saab-and-kyiv-school-of-economics-launch-strategic-collaboration-in-critical-defence-technologies-en-0-5319300.pdf?utm_source=openai

In short: the best-confirmed combat record among Swedish systems belongs to the RBS 70, while the most valuable sensor link is the Giraffe radars. But they perform different functions: the RBS 70 engages targets, while the Giraffe detects them, tracks them and passes on target designation.
Indicative ranking
| System | Against drones | Against cruise missiles | Real combat experience | Rating |
|---|---:|---:|---|---|
| RBS 70 / RBS 70 NG with Bolide missiles | Very good against large UAVs, Shahed-type targets and reconnaissance drones | Good against low-flying subsonic cruise missiles in favourable conditions | Has been used in Ukraine | The best-confirmed Swedish SAM system |
| Giraffe 1X | Very good as a radar for detecting small and low-flying targets | Good as an early-warning and tracking asset | Ukraine uses Giraffe radars | One of the best short/medium-range C-UAS radars |
| Giraffe AMB / AMB D | Very good, especially for covering an area or a unit | Better than the 1X for overall air picture and range | Combat use of the family is confirmed; detailed statistics are classified | The best all-round ground radar |
| TRIDON Mk2 + Giraffe 1X | Potentially very good and cheaper than a missile interceptor | Potentially good against subsonic cruise missiles | Being supplied/procured for Ukraine, but there are no open combat statistics yet | A very promising short-range defence asset |
| RBS 23 BAMSE | Good against larger UAVs and aircraft | Theoretically better than the RBS 70 thanks to its longer range | There is little open data on combat use in Ukraine | Strong, but not the best confirmed in practice |
| Giraffe 4A | Good for inclusion in a layered system | Very good as a long-range detection and tracking radar | The main value is as a sensor, not as a standalone interceptor | A higher-tier radar, not a direct analogue of the RBS 70 |
1. RBS 70 — the best by confirmed combat results
Ukrainian military personnel have reported using the RBS 70 against Russian cruise missiles and Iranian strike UAVs; there are also public reports of reconnaissance drones being hit. At the same time, there are no open independent statistics that would allow a precise comparison of its interception rate with the IRIS-T, NASAMS or Patriot. (twz.com)
Strengths
- SACLOS laser guidance is practically immune to electronic jamming and heat decoys.
- The missile Bolide has high speed and good manoeuvrability.
- Able to operate day and night, especially in the version RBS 70 NG with automatic tracking and a thermal sight.
- Suitable not only against aircraft and helicopters but also against sufficiently large drones and low-flying cruise missiles. Saab states an engagement range of up to approximately 9 km and an altitude of up to 5 km for the RBS 70 NG. (saab.com)
Limitations
RBS 70 — not a universal "anti-drone" asset:

- the operator must keep the laser on the target until impact;
- smoke, fog, precipitation, complex terrain or obstacles can degrade performance;
- against very small FPV drones, the missile is often not cost-effective;
- the system is not designed to intercept ballistic missiles;
- simultaneous engagement of a massed swarm is limited by the number of launchers and operators.

Therefore it is best used against Shahed-type UAVs, reconnaissance drones, helicopters and individual low-flying cruise missiles, and not against a swarm of cheap FPVs.
2. Giraffe 1X — a very strong radar specifically for drones
The Giraffe 1X is a compact short-range 3D AESA radar. It has all-round coverage, a fast update of the air picture and special algorithms for small, slow and low-flying targets. Saab positions it as a sensor for detecting drones, loitering munitions, missiles, helicopters and aircraft. (saab.com)

Its main advantage is not range as such, but the ability not to lose a small target against a background of ground clutter, birds and interference. According to Saab, the instrumented range of the Giraffe 1X is approximately 75 km, but the actual detection range for a specific drone depends on its radar cross-section, altitude and terrain conditions. (saab.com)

In combination:

> Giraffe 1X → C2 → RBS 70 NG

the radar finds and tracks the target, the command system allocates it among fire assets, and the RBS 70 carries out the interception. Such a combination is far more effective than a standalone man-portable RBS 70 without external target designation. (saab.com)
3. Giraffe AMB — better for a wider coverage zone
Giraffe AMB plays a larger role in building the air picture and can work simultaneously with different types of targets — from small UAVs to aircraft and cruise missiles. The updated AMB D version is equipped with drone-tracking functions and is designed for integration into ground-based air defence. (saab.com)

For Ukraine, its advantage is that it can:

- give early warning of an air attack;
- pass targets to other SAM systems and fighters;
- monitor a larger section of the front or an important area;
- operate as a node in a sensor network, not just as the "radar of a single battery".

Ukraine's Ministry of Defence describes the Giraffe family of radars as having already made a noticeable contribution to Ukraine's air surveillance, but detailed interception figures and combat statistics are not published. (mod.gov.ua)
4. TRIDON Mk2 — potentially the best option against mass cheap drones
TRIDON Mk2 is a self-propelled remotely operated 40 mm Bofors gun with 3P programmable ammunition. The system is designed to counter drones, loitering munitions, cruise missiles, helicopters and aircraft at low altitudes. (baesystems.com)

Its key advantage over the RBS 70 is the cost per shot and the ability to deliver rapid repeat fire. Against a swarm of Shaheds or a group of drones, a gun system may be more economically sensible than using missiles.

However, an important caveat applies: according to open reports on deliveries to Ukraine, there are insufficient public combat statistics on the TRIDON, so for now it is more correct to call it promising rather than a system already proven in the war.
5. BAMSE and Giraffe 4A
RBS 23 BAMSE has a longer range and is designed to protect important facilities from aircraft, helicopters and some missile threats. But it does not have such publicly confirmed experience in Ukraine as the RBS 70. It is also harder to deploy en masse because of its greater complexity and the limited number of systems.

Giraffe 4A is already a long-range radar and a multifunctional sensor platform. It is important for early detection of cruise missiles, aircraft and large UAVs, but is not itself an engagement asset. Its value is greatest as part of a layered system with Patriot, NASAMS, IRIS-T, Hawk, RBS 70 or gun-based systems. (saab.com)
Practical conclusion
If we rank the systems by purpose:

- The best confirmed Swedish interceptor: RBS 70 NG + Bolide.
- The best compact radar against drones: Giraffe 1X.
- The best all-round radar for an area/formation: Giraffe AMB D.
- The most promising asset against mass cheap UAVs: TRIDON Mk2 with Giraffe 1X, but its combat effectiveness in Ukraine has yet to be confirmed.
- For cruise missiles: The Giraffe is very useful as a radar and target designator, while the RBS 70 can intercept individual low-flying targets; against ballistic missiles these systems are not the primary solution.
- The best configuration: not a standalone RBS 70, but an integrated network of Giraffe + C2 + RBS 70/Tridon + electronic warfare assets and guns.

So, to answer in one sentence: the RBS 70 has performed best as a Swedish combat engagement asset, and the Giraffe 1X/AMB as detection and control assets; it is their combination that gives the greatest effect against modern drones and low-flying missiles.

---
Sources:
1. https://www.twz.com/ukraine-situation-report-new-details-on-russias-plans-to-build-iranian-drones?utm_source=openai
2. https://www.saab.com/newsroom/stories/2022/october/which-ground-based-air-defence-gbad-solution-is-best?utm_source=openai
3. https://www.saab.com/site-settings/html5/mshorad/index.html?utm_source=openai
4. https://www.saab.com/newsroom/press-releases/2017/saabs-mobile-shorad-rolls-into-dsei-for-the-first-time?utm_source=openai
5. https://www.saab.com/globalassets/sites/laad2023/1.-land-solutions/mshorad.pdf?utm_source=openai
6. https://www.saab.com/products/giraffe-amb-d?utm_source=openai
7. https://mod.gov.ua/en/news/the-watchful-eyes-of-ukraine-s-air-defence-an-overview-of-the-swedish-giraffe-radar-system?utm_source=openai
8. https://www.baesystems.com/en-us/product/tridon-mk2?componentId=contentListing-c82ffea3-edd8-43bf-b5cb-a9892e2f84ec&searchPageNo=5&utm_source=openai
9. https://www.saab.com/products/giraffe-4a?utm_source=openai

Ukrainian armoured vehicles need not just an "anti-thermal cover", but comprehensive signature management — signature management. Barracuda MCS is one example of this approach: the system works simultaneously in the visible, near and short-wave infrared bands, the thermal band and partly against radar surveillance. (saab.com)
What should be considered a priority. 1. A multispectral mobile kit for every vehicle
For tanks, IFVs, APCs, MRAPs, recovery and command vehicles, a kit like MCSis needed, which:

- reduces the vehicle's contrast against the terrain;
- has no shiny surfaces;
- masks the characteristic outlines of the turret, hull, barrel and external equipment;
- works in the visible, NIR/SWIR and thermal bands;
- does not interfere with observation, firing, or the operation of antennas, sensors and active protection systems;
- can be quickly removed for repair and maintenance.

It is important that it be specifically a mobile system for movement, and not an ordinary camouflage net for parking. Saab explicitly separates such solutions: the MCS is intended for moving platforms, while lightweight multispectral screens are for positions, technical areas and temporary shelters. (saab.com)
2. Thermal management, not just "absorbing infrared radiation"
The most problematic areas of an armoured vehicle are:

- the exhaust;
- the engine-transmission compartment;
- the heated roof and upper front plate;
- the barrel after firing;
- wheels and tracks;
- hot-air outlets.

Therefore Ukrainian kits must include:

- heat-dissipating and thermally insulating elements;
- a standoff outer layer that creates a ventilation gap;
- protection from solar heating;
- exhaust visibility control;
- solutions that do not overheat the engine or create a fire hazard.

Barracuda MCS, for example, combines reduced thermal signature with protection against solar heating, dust and overheating of the interior. (saab.com)
3. Reversible and seasonal kits
Ukraine particularly needs:

- a summer green-brown variant;
- an autumn variant for bare ground and yellowed vegetation;
- a winter white-grey one;
- an urban and industrial variant;
- separate modules for forest, steppe and built-up areas.

It makes sense to have double-sided or quick-change materials, so that a unit does not have to repaint a vehicle when changing operating area. Barracuda ARCAS, for example, uses a reversible design for two different environments and combines visible, IR and radar camouflage. (saab.com)
4. Separate lightweight multispectral nets for parking
Even a well-camouflaged vehicle will be vulnerable during:

- refuelling;
- repair;
- crew waiting;
- ammunition loading;
- command post operation;
- time spent near a depot or recovery equipment.

Rapidly deployable nets are needed with:

- a 3D structure to break up the silhouette;
- thermal screening;
- adaptation to the terrain;
- the ability to cover not only the vehicle but also the space around it;
- low weight and resistance to wind, moisture, dirt and ignition.

It is precisely such multispectral screens, and not merely painting the equipment, that US programmes consider as a means against visual, IR, thermal and radar reconnaissance. (asafm.army.mil)
5. Protection of optics and signature "windows"
A camera, thermal imager, periscope, tow hitch, metal box or exposed antenna can give a vehicle away even when the hull is camouflaged. What is needed:

- low-signature covers for sensors;
- anti-glare coatings;
- camouflage of joints and mountings;
- compatibility with the crew's thermal-imaging channels;
- quick opening of observation sectors without dismantling the whole system.

At the same time, sensors cannot be covered completely: the goal is to reduce contrast and glare, not to deprive the crew of observation.
6. A system for the whole vehicle fleet, not just the tank
The greatest effect will come from a standardised set for:

- tanks;
- IFVs and APCs;
- armoured cars;
- recovery and repair vehicles;
- tractors and fuel tankers;
- communications and command vehicles;
- engineering equipment;
- unmanned ground platforms.

Camouflaging only the combat vehicle does not solve the problem if thermal "beacons" remain nearby — trucks, generators, repair assets or crews. Ukraine's Ministry of Defence has already separately worked on anti-thermal-imaging materials for personnel, which shows the need for a comprehensive approach. (mod.gov.ua)
What the optimal set would be
For each armoured vehicle, I would consider the following configuration:

1. A mobile multispectral "shell" of the Barracuda MCS type.
2. Thermal protection modules for the roof, engine compartment and exhaust system.
3. Reversible seasonal panels or covers.
4. A lightweight multispectral net for parking and repair.
5. Low-signature covers for optics and antennas.
6. A crew kit — ponchos, covers, gloves and equipment with a reduced thermal signature.
7. Camouflage of trailers, generators and repair equipment.
8. A quick-restoration kit after damage or contamination.
What to check during procurement
Decisions should not be made solely on the advertising phrase "invisible to thermal imagers". Tests are needed:

- in the MWIR and LWIR bands;
- by day and night;
- after movement and after prolonged engine operation;
- in rain, fog, snow and heat;
- against a background of forest, field, soil, concrete and destroyed buildings;
- from different altitudes and angles, including from UAVs;
- together with installed armament, antennas, cameras and protective screens.

The key criterion is not absolute "invisibility" but increasing time to detection, reducing the range of confident identification and complicating targeting.
Conclusion
The most needed for Ukrainian armoured vehicles:

- mobile multispectral systems of the Barracuda MCS class;
- lightweight thermal and radar camouflage nets;
- integrated management of the engine and exhaust thermal trace;
- seasonal reversible kits;
- protection of optics, antennas and external equipment;
- camouflage of the entire logistics "tail", not just tanks.

At the same time, such systems do not replace dispersal, shelters, smoke assets, radio discipline or counter-UAV measures. They must be one layer of multi-layered survivability, and not a standalone "magic" coating.

---
Sources:
1. https://www.saab.com/products/mcs-mobile-camouflage-system?utm_source=openai
2. https://www.saab.com/globalassets/products/dynamics/barracuda-arcas/saabbarracuda_arcase.pdf?utm_source=openai
3. https://www.asafm.army.mil/Portals/72/Documents/BudgetMaterial/2024/Base%20Budget/rdte/RDTE-Vol%202-Budget%20Activity%205B.pdf?utm_source=openai
4. https://mod.gov.ua/news/minoboroni-pochalo-testuvannya-tkanin-dlya-anti-teplovizijnoi-nakidki?utm_source=openai

The NLAW played a noticeable, but not the only, role in repelling the Russian offensive of 2022. Their impact was greatest in the first weeks of the full-scale war — during the battles for Kyiv, the Chernihiv and Sumy regions and in other areas where Russian armoured groups moved along roads and often operated without proper reconnaissance and infantry cover.
What their role was
- Rapid reinforcement of infantry. The large number of NLAWs transferred by the United Kingdom on the eve of the invasion and after it began gave Ukrainian units the ability to hit tanks without heavy anti-tank artillery. By July 2022, the UK reported transferring more than 5,000 NLAWs to Ukraine; the total number of anti-tank weapons was even greater. (questions-statements.parliament.uk)
- Particular suitability for ambushes. The NLAW is designed for short ranges, rapid use from cover and a top-attack mode in which the warhead hits the less-protected upper part of the tank. It also has a direct-attack mode. The British Army describes it as a relatively simple system for light infantry to use, including in built-up areas. (army.mod.uk)
- Tactical and psychological effect. The NLAW allowed small Ukrainian groups to stop or scatter armoured columns, especially on narrow roads, in forests and in settlements. This does not mean that all Russian tank kills in the first months were the result of the NLAW specifically, but the system became one of the symbols of Ukrainian anti-tank defence. Ukrainian military sources separately noted its effectiveness in wooded terrain and in fighting in the north of the country. (armyinform.com.ua)
- Buying time. The NLAW helped hold back mechanised units until more artillery, minefields, Javelins, Stugna-Ps and other assets were deployed. Its significance lay not only in the number of vehicles destroyed but also in the fact that it made the movement of armour risky even where Ukraine had no advantage in heavy weapons.
What the military's reputation of the NLAW is now
Overall, the reputation is good, but no longer mythologised, as it was in spring 2022.

Strengths that the military usually values:

1. Simplicity and speed of use. The system does not require prolonged guidance after launch: the operator acquires the target, fires the missile and can change position. This is important against tanks that return fire quickly.
2. Compactness and mobility. The NLAW is easier to carry and use in a city, tree lines and defensive positions than heavier anti-tank systems.
3. Effectiveness in close combat. It remains useful for ambushing armour, especially when a target appears suddenly at short range.
4. Positively rated reliability. Even the British Ministry of Defence cited its mobility, reliability and accuracy as important reasons for its value to Ukraine. (gov.uk)

At the same time, there are important limitations:

- it is a single-use and fairly expensive munition;
- range and armour penetration limit it compared with more powerful or longer-range systems;
- modern armour uses reactive protection, screens, "cope cages" and other means of reducing vulnerability;
- the NLAW can be used against light vehicles or field shelters, but this is often irrational because of its high cost;
- guaranteed target destruction requires correct choice of position, angle of attack and sufficient operator training.
Has the NLAW lost its significance because of drones?
Relatively — yes, but not entirely. On the modern front, drones, FPV munitions, reconnaissance and artillery have become more central means of combating armour. Because of this, the NLAW is no longer perceived as a universal "tank killer". The war has shown that results come not from a single system but from a combination of reconnaissance — detection — engagement — changing position.

However, the NLAW has an advantage that many FPVs lack: it was built from the outset as a specialised anti-tank weapon, does not depend on a control link after launch, and can be used when a target suddenly appears at close range or when a drone cannot be launched. Analyses of the war continue to count the NLAW among the systems that inflicted significant losses on Russian armour, although its effect should not be attributed to a single type of weapon alone. (ausa.org)
Summary
For Ukrainian military personnel, the NLAW is most likely "a very useful specialised tool", not a universal weapon. In 2022 it had a strategically important effect: it helped infantry survive the first blow and made Russian armoured columns vulnerable. As of now, its reputation remains positive thanks to its simplicity, mobility and effectiveness in ambushes, but its use is assessed more pragmatically — alongside FPV drones, mines, artillery, the Javelin and the Stugna-P, rather than instead of them.

---
Sources:
1. https://questions-statements.parliament.uk/written-statements/detail/2022-07-21/hlws258?utm_source=openai
2. https://www.army.mod.uk/learn-and-explore/equipment/small-arms-and-support-weapons/guided-weapons/?utm_source=openai
3. https://armyinform.com.ua/2022/05/14/nlaw-osoblyvo-efektyvnyj-v-umovah-lisystoyi-misczevosti-abo-yak-pihotynczi-rozryvaly-tehniku-rashystiv-na-shmatky/?utm_source=openai
4. https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-orders-thousands-more-anti-tank-weapons-to-bolster-stockpiles?utm_source=openai
5. https://www.ausa.org/publications/land-warfare-paper/lessons-encountered-ukraine?utm_source=openai

As of 22 October 2026, the following projects are the most clearly confirmed in open official reports:

| Company | What it plans or is already doing in Ukraine | Status |
|---|---|---|
| Rheinmetall, Germany | Has already opened, jointly with "Ukrainian Defence Industry", a repair and service centre in western Ukraine. Marders are serviced there; going forward, repair of Leopard 1/2 and other German equipment is planned. Separately, production of 155 mm ammunition in Ukraine has been announced, as well as local assembly and production of armoured vehicles. | The most advanced project: the service centre is operating, production projects are being rolled out. (rheinmetall.com) |
| KNDS — KMW/Nexter, France–Germany | In October 2024 it opened KNDS Ukraine in Kyiv. The goal is to transfer to Ukrainian industry the capabilities for repairing Leopard 1/2, CAESAR, AMX-10RC, PzH 2000 and Gepard. Joint production of 155 mm ammunition and spare parts in Ukraine has also been announced. | A service and industrial presence has been established; production plans have been announced. (knds.com) |
| Kongsberg, Norway | In June 2025 it opened a permanent office in Kyiv and concluded agreements with Ukrainian companies on joint development and production of cheaper air-defence missiles compatible with NASAMS. Separately, it concerns the joint creation of uncrewed surface vessels. | A permanent office and cooperative production projects; this is not yet a large plant. (kongsberg.com) |
| Babcock, United Kingdom | Has had Babcock Ukraine and an office in Ukraine since 2023. The company supports British equipment, trains Ukrainian specialists and, together with Ukrainian industry, carries out repairs of British armoured vehicles, including the CVR(T). It also has contracts to support Ukrainian minesweepers. | Primarily a service and engineering hub, not a production plant. (babcockinternational.com) |
| Saab, Sweden | Saab is involved in the Ukrainian programme Build in Ukraine and is publicly considering localising production. In October 2025, Sweden and Ukraine signed a letter of intent on air capabilities, and in February 2026 Saab and "Ukrainian Defence Industry" concluded a memorandum of cooperation in aviation and air surveillance. | A promising partner; a specific plant or service centre with a launch date has not been publicly confirmed. (saab.com) |
Who else is worth watching
- FFG, Germany — the Ukrainian side named the company among those expanding their presence in Ukraine, in particular in armoured vehicles and repair. But the specific parameters of its future Ukrainian hub have been disclosed less publicly than those of Rheinmetall or KNDS. (mod.gov.ua)
- Nammo, Norway–Finland — appears among the partners developing production cooperation with Ukraine, primarily in ammunition, but there is currently insufficient public confirmation of a full-fledged plant or large service centre specifically on Ukrainian territory. (neweurope.org.ua)
- Radionor Communications, Norway — is discussing the creation of a service centre for secure communications systems, but this is rather a specialised technical centre than a defence giant. (mod.gov.ua)
Brief conclusion
If we separate real sites from memoranda, the picture is as follows:

1. Rheinmetall — effectively the main foreign industrial partner, with a service centre already operating and plans for ammunition and armoured-vehicle production.
2. KNDS — the second most concrete track: a Ukrainian subsidiary has been created, and repair and production of spare parts and ammunition are being prepared.
3. Kongsberg — is actively entering through air defence, missiles and naval drones.
4. Babcock — is rolling out a service and repair presence, but not mass production.
5. Saab — a strategically very important candidate, especially for air defence, radars, aviation and sensors, but a specific Saab factory in Ukraine remains a plan for now, not a confirmed, launched facility.

---
Sources:
1. https://www.rheinmetall.com/en/media/news-watch/news/2024/06/2024-06-11-rheinmetall-ukrainian-defense-industry-repair-hub?referer=en%2Fproducts%2Fpropellants%2Fpropulsion%2Fautomotive%3Foref%3Dd_brief_nl&utm_source=openai
2. https://knds.com/en/press-releases/ukrainian-subsidiary-of-armaments-group-knds-opened?utm_source=openai
3. https://www.kongsberg.com/news/news-archive/2025/kongsberg-to-develop-missiles-and-drone-boats-in-ukraine/?utm_source=openai
4. https://www.babcockinternational.com/news/babcock-scales-up-support-to-ukraine/?utm_source=openai
5. https://www.saab.com/uk-UA/markets/ukraine/news/saab-and-joint-stock-company-ukrainian-defense-industry-sign-memorandum-of-understanding?utm_source=openai
6. https://mod.gov.ua/en/news/ukraine-announces-a-new-initiative-for-the-joint-production-of-ukrainian-weapons-in-countries-participating-in-the-ramstein-format?utm_source=openai
7. https://neweurope.org.ua/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/Defence-co-production_eng_web.pdf?utm_source=openai
8. https://mod.gov.ua/en/news/meeting-at-the-ministry-of-defence-norwegian-defense-company-opens-branch-in-ukraine?utm_source=openai

As of the published arrangements, Saab has not named a full list of specific models already approved for joint production. These are mostly memoranda, joint developments, localisation, repair and technology partnership. The most realistic areas are as follows:

1. Radars, sensors and defence electronics
In March 2025, Saab and the Ukrainian company Radionix signed a memorandum on cooperation in developing and servicing sensors and military electronics. The Ukrainian side has competencies in radar and electro-optical equipment, the Swedish side in sensors, radars and defence-system integration. (saab.com)

2. Air surveillance and command-and-control systems
In February 2026, Saab and JSC "Ukrainian Defence Industry" signed an MoU on cooperation in aviation and air surveillance. This may cover airborne radars, early-warning systems, data processing, command and control, as well as integration of Ukrainian platforms and digital solutions. Specific products are not named in the document. (saab.com)

3. Air and missile defence assets
Ukraine and Sweden have announced joint work on anti-ballistic solutions, as well as other technologies for strengthening air defence. Saab already supplies radars and has competencies in ground-based air defence, in particular Giraffe-family systems and RBS 70 systems. However, there is currently no confirmation of the launch of joint production of the RBS 70 or another specific system in Ukraine. (mod.gov.ua)

4. Electronic warfare and counter-drone assets
Possible areas include electronic warfare systems, detection and tracking of small unmanned aircraft, sensor complexes, command posts and integrated counter-UAS systems. Sweden and Ukraine have already identified electronic warfare as a separate area of cooperation, and the Ukrainian side is interested in joint production of solutions for intercepting drones and countering guided aerial bombs. (mod.gov.ua)

5. Aviation systems and, in the longer term, Gripen fighters
The parties are discussing aviation cooperation, training of Ukrainian pilots, supply of JAS 39 Gripen E/F and potential joint projects between Ukrainian and Swedish companies. In October 2026, Saab reported further steps towards Ukraine's acquisition of the Gripen E/F, but this does not mean an automatic decision on joint production of aircraft in Ukraine. The most likely first stages would be maintenance, repair, production of individual components and training of personnel. (kmu.gov.ua)

6. Satellite technologies and secure communications
Ukraine and Sweden agreed to strengthen cooperation in space technologies; separately, satellite communications and the use of space radar data were discussed. This may include secure communication channels, remote-sensing data processing, and integration of satellite information with troop command-and-control and intelligence systems. (kmu.gov.ua)

7. CV90 armoured vehicles — primarily repair and service
Ukraine and Sweden considered creating capacity in Ukraine for servicing and repairing Swedish infantry fighting vehicles CV90. This is an important area of localisation, but at present it is specifically service and repair cooperation that has been publicly confirmed, not full-scale joint production of the CV90. (mod.gov.ua)

What is not yet confirmed: joint production in Ukraine of specific systems — Gripen, Meteor, Carl-Gustaf, AT4, NLAW, RBS 70 or Giraffe radars. These products are part of Saab's portfolio or are being discussed in the context of defence cooperation, but there is no officially published contract for their joint production with Ukrainian enterprises. (saab.com)

So, the nearest practical prospects are radars and sensors, defence electronics, electronic warfare, air defence/counter-drone systems, air surveillance, satellite communications, and service of aviation and armoured equipment. Production of the Gripen itself or Saab missiles is for now more a long-term prospect than an approved project.

---
Sources:
1. https://mod.gov.ua/en/news/ukraine-and-its-swedish-partners-are-working-to-bolster-aviation-and-air-defence-capabilities
2. https://www.kmu.gov.ua/en/news/ukraina-ta-shvetsiia-domovylys-pro-spilne-vyrobnytstvo-oboronnoi-produktsii-na-terytorii-obokh-krain
3. https://www.saab.com/uk-UA/markets/ukraine/news/saab-and-radionix-sign-mou-for-sensors-and-defence-electronics?utm_source=openai
4. https://www.saab.com/globalassets/cision/documents/2026/20260213-saab-and-joint-stock-company-ukrainian-defense-industry-sign-memorandum-of-understanding-en-0-5306096.pdf
5. https://mod.gov.ua/en/news/ukraine-and-sweden-continue-expanding-their-strategic-cooperation-in-the-defense-industry
6. https://www.saab.com/globalassets/corporate/investor-relations/annual-report/2026/saab-ar25-eng.pdf?utm_source=openai

The supply of Swedish weapons, in particular those produced by the aerospace and defence giant SAABto Ukraine was accompanied by a number of serious political, bureaucratic and reputational risks. For Sweden this became a historic step, as the country abandoned its long-standing policy of neutrality.

Here is a detailed breakdown of these risks:
1. Political risks

• Breaking with historical tradition: Until 2022, Sweden had a strict policy of not exporting weapons to countries with active armed conflict. The decision to supply weapons to Ukraine was the first such case since the Winter War of 1939 (when Sweden helped Finland). This prompted domestic political debate over whether it would set a precedent for selling weapons to other warring states in the future.

• Russia's reaction and hybrid threats: The supply of advanced systems (NLAW, Carl Gustaf, Archer, Saab 340 AEW airborne early-warning aircraft, as well as the 2026 decision to transfer JAS 39 Gripen fighters) made Sweden a target of Russian political pressure, cyberattacks and disinformation campaigns. This risk was especially acute during the period when Sweden was still going through the process of joining NATO and was not protected by the Alliance's Article 5.
2. Bureaucratic risks

• Export control and legislation: The Swedish Inspectorate of Strategic Products (ISP) has some of the strictest arms-export rules in the world. The government and the bureaucratic apparatus had to look for quick legal mechanisms to bypass the standard restrictions in order to ensure prompt deliveries.

• The problem of re-export and foreign components: Modern weapons are a product of globalisation. For example, SAAB's Gripen fighters use engines based on American technology (General Electric) and may also contain components from other European countries. This created a bureaucratic risk: to transfer such equipment to Ukraine, Sweden had to obtain permissions from third countries (for example, the US under ITAR rules), which could delay or block the process.

• Balancing its own defence capability: The Swedish Defence Materiel Administration (FMV) had to solve a difficult task — how to transfer weapons to Ukraine without weakening its own army. For example, the 2026 decision to transfer up to 16 Gripen C/D fighters to Ukraine forced the government to urgently order additional new Gripen E aircraft from SAAB for its own Air Force.
3. Reputational and security risks for SAAB

• Physical security of management and sabotage: As SAAB's role in supporting Ukraine has grown, the company has faced direct threats from hostile intelligence services. For example, in August 2026 Swedish police investigated an incident near the country house of SAAB CEO Micael Johansson, where Russian citizens with long-range radios were spotted. This underscores the risks of industrial espionage and intimidation.

• Risk of technology capture (reverse engineering): Transferring high-tech weapons always carries the risk that they will fall into enemy hands. If Russian forces capture the latest SAAB radars, electronic warfare systems or missiles, they may try to copy the technology or find ways to counter it effectively.

• Image losses on the battlefield: Any equipment, even the best, gets destroyed in intense war. If SAAB's flagship products (for example, Gripen fighters) suffer losses to Russian air defence, this could be used by Russian propaganda and by SAAB's competitors on the global arms market to reduce the export appeal of Swedish weapons.

• The "black market" risk: The traditional reputational risk for any arms manufacturer is the fear that weapons may be resold or fall into the hands of third parties. SAAB has to rely on strict anti-corruption programmes and oversight by the governments of Sweden and Ukraine.
The flip side: why the risks paid off
Despite all the listed challenges, for Sweden and SAAB these risks turned into significant strategic and commercial benefits:
1. "Combat-proven" status: Weapons developed by SAAB (especially NLAW anti-tank systems and Carl Gustaf recoilless rifles) proved themselves brilliantly in Ukraine, which sharply increased global demand for the company's products.
2. Innovation and testing: Ukraine has become a unique testing ground for technology. SAAB receives priceless data from the real battlefield, allowing it to improve radars, surveillance systems and aviation.
3. Joint production: SAAB is actively integrating into Ukraine's defence industry. The company has signed memoranda of cooperation (in particular with Ukraine's defence-technology cluster Brave1), which opens the way to joint production of drones, electronic warfare systems and equipment servicing directly in Ukraine.

So, although the political and reputational risks were unprecedented, they became a catalyst for the development of the Swedish defence industry and for strengthening SAAB's role as one of the key players in European security.

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Sources:
1. https://fuf.se/en/magasin/dubbelmoralen-inom-svensk-vapenexport/
2. https://stopwapenhandel.org/militarisation-of-europe-at-the-cost-of-arms-export-control/
3. https://ambitionsverige.se/en/politics/defence/
4. https://www.ukrainesarmsmonitor.com/p/arms-trends-in-ukraine-25-may-31
5. https://macemagazine.com/business-under-pressure-what-ukraines-resilience-reveals-about-britains-new-security-risks/
6. https://www.saab.com/newsroom/press-releases/2026/ukraine-and-sweden-take-steps-towards-ukrainian-gripen-acquisition
7. https://reddit.com
8. https://kyivindependent.com/sweden-set-to-provide-gripen-fighter-jets-to-ukraine-media-reports/
9. https://www.youtube.com/s/desktop/a6171d17/img/favicon.ico
10. https://thedefensepost.com/2026/07/23/sweden-expands-gripen-order/
11. https://tradersunion.com
12. https://www.saab.com/sustainability/resilient-and-safe-societies/anti-corruption/abc-programme
13. https://militaeraktuell.at
14. https://www.kyivpost.com/post/70233
15. https://united24media.com/war-in-ukraine/sweden-and-ukraine-how-two-countries-built-one-of-europes-most-important-defence-partnerships-20035
16. https://government.se
17. https://mod.gov.ua/en/news/one-billion-for-explosives-low-cost-missiles-and-agreements-with-airbus-and-saab-key-takeaways-from-brave1-advantage
18. https://mfa.gov.ua

For a large multinational arms manufacturer of the calibre of SAAB (high-tech systems, aviation, air defence, anti-tank assets, radars), entering the Ukrainian defence procurement market differs substantially from standard commercial sales. Today Ukraine is not just a sales market but a platform for joint production, testing in real combat conditions and strategic partnership.

To enter this market effectively and gain a foothold in it, a company of this level needs to act on a comprehensive strategy. Here is a step-by-step plan and key recommendations:
1. Political level and the G2G (Government-to-Government) format
Deals on SAAB's scale (for example, the supply of Gripen aircraft, Giraffe radars or NLAW/Carl Gustaf systems) are rarely concluded purely at a commercial level.

• Intergovernmental agreements: Market entry should be accompanied by the support of the home country's government (in SAAB's case, the Swedish government and the Swedish defence authority FMV).

• International funds: It is worth actively working with international initiatives, such as the International Fund for Ukraine (IFU) under the auspices of the United Kingdom, which finance purchases for the Armed Forces of Ukraine from Western manufacturers.
2. Engagement with key stakeholders in Ukraine
The manufacturer needs to build direct communication with the three main decision-making centres:

• Ministry of Defence of Ukraine (MoD): Shapes policy and defines the requirement and the tactical and technical requirements for weapons.

• Defence Procurement Agency (DPA): The single national buyer of lethal weapons and military equipment. They are the ones who conclude direct contracts with foreign manufacturers.

• Ministry of Strategic Industries (Minstratehprom): The main partner for creating joint ventures and localising production.
3. Localisation strategy (the key success factor)
Ukraine is moving away from the "just buy ready-made" model because of budget limitations and the need to develop its own defence industry. The most successful foreign giants (Rheinmetall, BAE Systems, Baykar) have already created joint ventures in Ukraine.
For SAAB, the following path would be effective:

• Stage 1: MRO (Maintenance, Repair, and Overhaul). Creating maintenance and repair centres in Ukraine (or in neighbouring countries with Ukrainian personnel) for equipment already delivered.

• Stage 2: Assembly (SKD/CKD). Large-unit assembly of systems (for example, anti-tank systems or drones) on Ukrainian territory.

• Stage 3: Joint Venture. Creating a joint venture with JSC "Ukrainian Defence Industry" (UDI) or large private Ukrainian companies (members of NAUDI) for full-scale production with technology transfer.
4. Using the "Danish model" of financing
Since Ukraine's state budget is limited, the so-called "Danish model" (ZBROYARI: Manufacturing Freedom) is currently extremely popular.

• The essence: A foreign government (for example, Sweden's) allocates funds used to buy weapons produced *in Ukraine
• (or at a joint venture in Ukraine).

• For SAAB this means that, by creating a joint venture in Ukraine, the company will be able to receive financing not only from the Ukrainian MoD but also from European donors.
5. Practical steps for legal and operational entry
1. Opening an LLC in Ukraine: Creating an official representative office (subsidiary) that will allow hiring local personnel and engineers and working legally with state secrets.
2. Registration with the DPA: Passing compliance and inclusion in the register of qualified suppliers of the Defence Procurement Agency.
3. Obtaining certificates: Adapting its products to the requirements of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (codification under NATO standards and admission for use by Ukraine's MoD). The codification process is now maximally simplified (up to 10–20 days for proven samples).
4. Participation in closed tenders: Procurement of lethal weapons does not take place in the open Prozorro system. It is carried out through closed DPA procedures, to which verified manufacturers are invited.
6. Risk management (security)
For a company of SAAB's level, the security of technology and personnel is critical:

• Physical security: Production capacity in Ukraine must be dispersed or housed in underground bunkers for protection from missile strikes.

• Cybersecurity and IP protection: Strict intellectual-property protection protocols when handing over drawings to Ukrainian partners.

• War-risk insurance: Using investment insurance mechanisms through MIGA (World Bank), DFC or national export credit agencies (for example, Sweden's EKN).

Summary:
To enter the market effectively, SAAB should not act as an ordinary seller. The optimal algorithm: open an office in Kyiv ➔ offer the MoD a "weapons + servicing in Ukraine" package ➔ conclude an agreement on creating a joint venture with Minstratehprom ➔ attract financing from the Swedish government or international funds to load this enterprise with orders for the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

As of autumn 2026, the deployment and servicing of Swedish Saab JAS 39 Gripen fighters in Ukraine is not merely a realistic scenario but a process that is already at the stage of active practical implementation. Experts and military analysts agree that the Gripen is perhaps the Western aircraft best adapted to the harsh realities of the Ukrainian theatre of operations.

Here is a detailed breakdown of the timelines and technical capabilities:
1. Deployment and delivery timelines
The process of transferring the aircraft is divided into two stages — rapid reinforcement and long-term fleet build-up:

• Near term (Gripen C/D): In May 2026, Sweden officially announced the free transfer to Ukraine of 16 C/D-variant fighters from its own armed forces' inventory. In October 2026, after a meeting with Swedish Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson, Ukraine's President stated that the first aircraft are expected "soon" (approximately at the end of 2026 – beginning of 2027). Ukrainian pilots and technicians are already undergoing the relevant training, and the process of integrating the aircraft into Ukraine's air defence system is actively under way.

• Long term (Gripen E/F): In June 2026, Saab signed a contract with the Swedish Defence Materiel Administration (FMV) to produce 16 new Gripen E fighters specifically for Ukraine. Deliveries of these new aircraft are planned for 2029–2030.
2. The reality of deployment (infrastructure)
The main advantage of the Gripens is that they were created during the Cold War with the Swedish dispersal doctrine in mind for a war with the USSR.

• Dispersed basing: The aircraft does not need perfect runways or permanent airfields, which are an easy target for Russian missiles. It is able to take off and land on ordinary highways.

• Mobility: Ukraine is already successfully applying decentralisation tactics for its F-16s, using truck-based mobile units for mission planning and maintenance. The Gripen fits this concept perfectly, since it was designed from the start to operate "off the truck" outside hangars.
3. Speed and ease of maintenance
Servicing the Gripen is one of the fastest and least demanding among all modern fighters:

• Rapid turnaround time: The aircraft is designed to minimise time on the ground. It can be refuelled and reloaded with ammunition even with the engine running. This is critical for aviation survival, since it allows the aircraft to land, replenish and take off again within minutes, minimising the risk of being destroyed on the ground.

• Ease of repair: In Sweden, field maintenance of these aircraft is often performed by small mobile teams consisting of one experienced technician and several conscripts. This means Ukrainian ground personnel can master it much faster than the more maintenance-intensive American counterparts.

• Weapons flexibility: The Gripen has an open architecture, which allows both American and European weapons to be integrated easily. In particular, Ukrainian aircraft are expected to be equipped with long-range Meteor air-to-air missiles, which will make it possible to effectively push back Russian aircraft carrying glide bombs at record distances.

Summary:
The timelines for deploying the Gripen in Ukraine are entirely realistic and fast. Thanks to its undemanding nature in terms of infrastructure, record-fast field maintenance and ability to operate under constant air threat, this aircraft is the least problematic to integrate into the Ukrainian Air Force during an intense war.

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Sources:
1. https://defencematters.eu/sweden-expected-to-announce-gripen-fighter-transfer-to-ukraine/
2. https://newsukraine.rbc.ua/news/ukraine-to-receive-swedish-gripen-fighter-1792176696.html
3. https://euromaidanpress.com
4. https://www.ukrainesarmsmonitor.com/p/arms-trends-in-ukraine-25-may-31
5. https://government.se
6. https://nv.ua
7. https://www.saab.com/newsroom/press-releases/2026/saab-signs-contract-for-gripen-e-for-ukraine
8. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/107th_Separate_Aviation_Wing_(Ukraine)
9. https://niss.gov.ua

The Swedish fighter JAS 39 Gripen is called by many military experts a conceptually ideal aircraft for the Ukrainian Air Force. Although Ukraine has already received F-16s, which are excellent and widely produced machines, the Gripen has a number of unique advantages that fit perfectly with the current realities of the war against Russia.

Here are the key advantages of the JAS 39 Gripen over the F-16 in Ukraine's conditions:
1. Undemanding with regard to runways

• Gripen: Was created under the Swedish dispersal doctrine (BAS 90). It is able to take off and land on ordinary highways and short, poorly prepared strips (only 800 metres long). Its landing gear is reinforced and the air intakes are located at the sides, which minimises the risk of ingesting debris from the ground.

• F-16: Has a large air intake located very low under the fuselage. It works like a "vacuum cleaner", so the F-16 requires perfectly clean, smooth and long concrete runways.

• Why this matters for Ukraine: Russia constantly attacks Ukrainian airfields with missiles and Shaheds. The ability to hide aircraft in tree lines and use ordinary highways for take-off is a critical advantage for the survival of aviation.
2. Ease of maintenance in the field

• Gripen: Was designed so that it can be serviced outside permanent bases. Preparing the aircraft for a new sortie (refuelling, loading missiles, checking systems) requires a team of only 5–6 people, of whom only one is a highly qualified technician, while the rest can be ordinary conscript soldiers after basic training. This process takes 10–15 minutes.

• F-16: Requires complex ground infrastructure, specialised equipment and a large number of highly qualified personnel for maintenance.
3. A powerful electronic warfare (EW) system

• Gripen: Sweden spent decades developing its aircraft with the sole purpose of countering the USSR/Russia. The Gripen's EW system is considered one of the best in the world precisely for suppressing Russian radars and surface-to-air missile systems (such as the S-300 and S-400).

• F-16: Also has good EW systems, but to reach the Gripen's level it often needs external pods, which take up weapon hardpoints and worsen aerodynamics.
4. Armament: the Meteor missile

• Gripen: Is fully integrated with the European air-to-air missile MBDA Meteor. Thanks to its ramjet engine, this missile retains enormous speed and manoeuvrability in the terminal phase of flight (unlike conventional missiles, which coast and lose energy). This makes it extremely lethal against Russian fighters at long range.

• F-16: Uses American AIM-120 AMRAAM missiles. It is an excellent weapon, but in duel situations at maximum ranges the Meteor is often considered more effective. In addition, the Gripen can carry powerful RBS-15 anti-ship missiles.
5. Cost-effectiveness

• Gripen: Is one of the cheapest modern fighters to operate. The cost of one flight hour is approximately $4,000–$5,000.

• F-16: A flight hour costs on average $8,000–$12,000 (depending on the variant). For a country at war with a limited budget, this is a significant difference.
Why, then, is Ukraine betting on the F-16?
Despite all the technical and conceptual advantages of the Gripen, the F-16 has one decisive advantage — mass production.

• More than 4,600 F-16s have been built, and they are in service with dozens of countries. They are easier to find and transfer, and huge stocks of spare parts and weapons exist for them around the world.

• Fewer than 300 Gripens have been built. Sweden itself needs these aircraft for its defence, and there are very few spare airframes in the world.

Summary: The JAS 39 Gripen is an aircraft that seems purpose-built for the conditions in which Ukraine is now fighting (operating from roads, minimal infrastructure, countering Russian air defence). However, the F-16 is a more pragmatic choice because of the availability of aircraft and spare parts and the political readiness of a large coalition of countries to supply them. Ideally, the Ukrainian Air Force aims to have both types of aircraft in the future.

Yes, Saab JAS 39 Gripen fighters can use unprepared airfields and sections of ordinary highways. Moreover, this is one of their main design features and greatest advantages, which makes this aircraft ideal for the conditions of the war in Ukraine.

Here are a few key facts about how this works and why it matters for Ukraine:
1. The Swedish dispersal doctrine (Bas 90)
The Gripen was created during the Cold War with the sole purpose of countering a potential invasion by the USSR (and later Russia). Swedish military doctrine assumed that in the event of war the enemy would first destroy the large permanent air bases. Therefore the aircraft was designed so that it could take off and land on ordinary highways or short dirt strips only 400–800 metres long and about 16 metres wide. By comparison: most Western fighters (for example, the F-16 or F/A-18) need perfectly clean and long runways (from 1,500 metres).
2. Maintenance in the field
The Gripen does not require complex airfield infrastructure. After completing a combat mission, the aircraft can land on a section of highway and pull into a tree line, where a mobile team will meet it. Refuelling and a full weapons reload (for example, with Meteor missiles) requires a team of only 5–6 people (usually one qualified technician and several conscript soldiers). This process takes only 10–20 minutes, after which the fighter is ready to take off again.
3. Why is this critical for Ukraine?
Russia regularly carries out missile and drone strikes on Ukrainian military airfields, trying to destroy aircraft on the ground. The Gripens' ability to be based on any straight section of highway makes them practically invulnerable to such attacks: the enemy simply will not know where the aircraft will take off from next time and where it will land.
4. The experience of Ukrainian pilots
For the Ukrainian Air Force, the concept of using highways is not new. Even before the start of the full-scale invasion, Ukrainian pilots flying MiG-29s and Su-27s regularly practised landing and take-off from highways during exercises. Some Ukrainian highways have already been specially prepared for such tasks (they have widened sections without dividing barriers or power lines). Therefore the integration of the Gripen into this system will be as natural as possible.

It is precisely because of its undemanding nature regarding infrastructure, tolerance of debris on runways and low maintenance cost that Ukraine chose the Swedish JAS 39 Gripen as one of the priority aircraft for building up its Air Force.

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Sources:
1. https://euromaidanpress.com
2. https://wesodonnell.medium.com/swedens-gripen-was-custom-made-for-the-ukraine-war-now-ukraine-will-find-out-if-it-works-dd988bfffb89
3. https://www.youtube.com/s/desktop/71381699/img/favicon.ico
4. https://www.rferl.org/a/gripen-fighters-ukraine-war-impact-russia-aviation/33768477.html
5. https://kyivindependent.com/sweden-set-to-provide-gripen-fighter-jets-to-ukraine-media-reports/
6. https://dumskaya.net/news/posadka-na-shosse-i-sborka-po-litcenzii-chem-hor-180853/ua/

As of 2026, cooperation between Ukraine and European partners in the defence sphere has gone far beyond the "donor – recipient" format. Today it is deep industrial integration, the creation of joint ventures, localisation of production in Ukraine and direct financing of Ukraine's defence industry with European funds. Europe is not only supplying weapons but is also actively adopting Ukrainian combat experience.

Here is a detailed overview of the most reliable and innovative European countries and companies that are key partners of Ukraine in defence.
🌍 The most reliable partner countries
1. Germany

• Role: The absolute leader in Europe in terms of volume of military aid and industrial integration.

• Contribution: Supply of critically important air defence systems (Patriot, IRIS-T, Skynex), armoured vehicles (Leopard, Marder, Gepard) and artillery. Germany became the first country whose defence giants began building plants directly on Ukrainian territory.
2. Denmark (and the Nordic countries)

• Role: The main financial innovator and leader of the "F-16 coalition" (together with the Netherlands).

• Contribution: Denmark introduced the so-called "Danish model" — direct financing of weapons production (including drones and the Bohdana self-propelled howitzer) at Ukrainian plants with funds from the Danish budget. In addition, in 2025–2026 Denmark became the first NATO country to allow production lines of Ukraine's defence industry to be located on its territory (for example, a rocket-fuel plant in Jutland). Norway and Sweden also play a key role in supplying infantry fighting vehicles (CV90), artillery (Archer) and ammunition.
3. France

• Role: A strategic partner in long-range weapons, artillery and aviation.

• Contribution: Supply of SCALP missiles, CAESAR self-propelled howitzers, AMX-10 RC armoured vehicles, as well as the transfer of Mirage 2000 fighters. France is actively encouraging its companies to open branches in Ukraine for equipment repair and spare-parts production.
4. United Kingdom

• Role: A pioneer in providing new types of weapons (Storm Shadow missiles, Challenger tanks) and leader of the maritime coalition.

• Contribution: Large-scale military training programmes, development of the Ukrainian navy (including naval drones) and involvement of British companies in localising the production of howitzers and armoured vehicles in Ukraine.
5. Czech Republic and Poland

• Role: The main logistics hubs and leaders of ammunition initiatives.

• Contribution: The Czech Republic initiated a global programme to procure hundreds of thousands of artillery shells for Ukraine. Poland remains a key transit hub, a supplier of Krab self-propelled howitzers and the location of repair bases for Western equipment.
6. Baltic states (Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia)

• Role: Leaders of the "drone coalition" and of innovative solution development.

• Contribution: Despite the small size of their economies, these countries devote the largest percentage of GDP to supporting Ukraine. Together with Ukraine, they develop and produce long-range UAVs, FPV drones and electronic warfare systems.
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🏭 The most innovative European defence companies in Ukraine
European defence giants have changed their strategy: instead of merely sending ready-made equipment, they are opening subsidiaries in Ukraine.

1. Rheinmetall (Germany)

• Status: The most active and aggressive (in a good sense) player on the Ukrainian market.

• Activity: The company created the joint venture *Rheinmetall Ukrainian Defense Industry*. Since 2024, equipment repair and maintenance hubs (Leopard, Marder, Fuchs) have been operating in Ukraine. The company is also implementing a strategy of building several plants in Ukraine: for artillery ammunition production (launch expected in 2026–2027), assembly of the new Lynx KF41 IFVs and air defence systems. In parallel, Rheinmetall built a new mega-plant in Germany (Unterlüß), which is already supplying Ukraine with tens of thousands of 155 mm shells.

2. KNDS (France / Germany)

• Status: Manufacturer of the legendary Leopard tanks and CAESAR self-propelled howitzers.

• Activity: In autumn 2024, the conglomerate (a merger of Germany's Krauss-Maffei Wegmann and France's Nexter) officially opened a subsidiary in Kyiv — KNDS Ukraine LLC. The main goal is rapid maintenance and repair of CAESAR and PzH 2000 howitzers, Leopard tanks and Gepard anti-aircraft guns directly in Ukraine. The company is also implementing joint production of 155 mm ammunition and 3D printing of scarce spare parts.

3. BAE Systems (United Kingdom)

• Status: One of the largest defence contractors in the world.

• Activity: The company opened an office in Ukraine and signed agreements on localising production of the lightweight 105 mm L119 howitzers. BAE Systems (through its Swedish subsidiary BAE Systems Hägglunds) is also cooperating closely with Ukraine on servicing and future joint production of the CV90 IFVs, which are recognised as among the best in their class.

4. Thales (France)

• Status: A leader in electronics, radars and electronic warfare systems.

• Activity: Thales is actively supplying Ukraine with radars for air defence systems (for example, the Ground Master 200), communications systems and electronic warfare. The company has concluded a number of agreements with Ukrainian drone developers to integrate its guidance systems and protection against enemy electronic warfare.

5. Czechoslovak Group (CSG) (Czech Republic) and Nammo (Norway/Finland)

• Status: Key players in addressing the "shell hunger" and in equipment modernisation.

• Activity: CSG is massively modernising Soviet equipment (T-72 and T-90 tanks) and producing artillery shells. Scandinavian Nammo is one of the most innovative ammunition manufacturers in Europe, having multiplied its capacity to meet the needs of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
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🚀 Main innovation trends of 2026
1. Direct EU financing: In 2026, the European Commission (under the EDIP programme and macro-financial assistance) began allocating billions of euros to buy weapons *directly from Ukrainian manufacturers
• (drones, missiles, electronic warfare) for the needs of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. This is an unprecedented step recognising that Ukraine's defence industry is able to produce innovative weapons cheaper and faster than European analogues.
2. Two-way technology exchange: Whereas Ukraine previously only asked for technology, European companies are now coming to Ukraine to study the experience of using FPV drones, interceptor drones, naval drones and battlefield management systems.
3. Cluster integration: Ukrainian defence clusters have become part of the European Network of Defence Regions (ENDR), which allows Ukrainian start-ups (MilTech) to integrate directly into European supply chains.

Summary: The most reliable partners today are those who are not afraid to invest in Ukraine during the war. Germany (Rheinmetall), France (KNDS, Thales), Britain (BAE Systems) and Denmark are shaping a new landscape of European security in which Ukraine's defence-industrial complex is becoming an inseparable part of the defence machine of the free world.

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Sources:
1. https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2026/10/22/8059168/
2. https://www.eesc.europa.eu/en/our-work/opinions-information-reports/opinions/strengthening-eu-defence-industry-and-innovations-including-through-enhanced-cooperation-ukraine
3. https://www.rheinmetall.com/en/media/stories/2026/rheinmetall-a-powerful-partner-at-ukraine-side
4. https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2025/02/16/7498605/
5. https://reddit.com
6. https://unn.ua/en/news/the-new-rheinmetall-plant-has-already-delivered-tens-of-thousands-of-155-mm-shells-to-ukraine-and-is-preparing-to-sharply-increase-production
7. https://knds.com/en/press-releases/ukrainian-subsidiary-of-armaments-group-knds-opened
8. https://euro-sd.com/2024/10/major-news/40580/knds-opens-subsidiary-in-kyiv/
9. https://knds.com/en/about-us/history
10. https://www.eunews.it/en/2026/10/08/europe-is-financing-ukraines-defence-industry-what-comes-next/
11. https://washingtontimes.com
12. https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/ukraines-first-cluster-joins-european-network-defence-related-regions-endr-2026-09-21_en

As of October 2026, the Swedish defence company SAAB Group demonstrates an exceptionally high level of readiness for cooperation with Ukraine. Its strategy has evolved from a "donor aid" format to deep industrial partnership and localisation of production on Ukrainian territory under the government's "Build in Ukraine" initiative.

SAAB CEO Micael Johansson has repeatedly stressed that the company's main goal is to help Ukraine create sovereign defence capabilities and integrate Ukraine's defence industry into the European ecosystem. To coordinate these processes, SAAB has even created a dedicated Ukrainian unit.

Main directions of the strategy and the current state of cooperation:

1. Aviation and Gripen fighters

• Deliveries: On 30 June 2026, SAAB signed a contract with the Swedish Defence Materiel Administration (FMV) for the production and delivery to Ukraine of 16 new multirole Gripen E fighters (handover planned for 2029–2030).

• Production localisation: According to statements by the Ukrainian Air Force command (August 2026), the Gripen supply contracts already contain provisions on localising their production and maintenance directly in Ukraine. This stage is planned to be implemented approximately from 2033, as soon as the security situation allows (protection from Russian long-range strikes).

• Modernisation of the Soviet-era fleet: SAAB is negotiating with Ukraine's MoD on modernising Ukrainian Soviet-era combat aircraft with advanced Swedish avionics (new radars, protection systems and electronic warfare).

2. Joint production of air defence systems
In October 2025, SAAB officially became a partner of Ukraine in the joint production of air defence systems. This involves deploying capacity to manufacture systems such as the RBS 70 NG man-portable surface-to-air missile systems, MSHORAD mobile systems and, potentially, radars of the Giraffe family. Experts note that launching air defence production is a technologically simpler step that will prepare the industrial base for future assembly of fighters.

3. Strategic memoranda with Ukraine's defence industry

• In February 2026, at the Munich Security Conference, SAAB and JSC "Ukrainian Defence Industry" (Ukroboronprom) signed a Memorandum of Understanding. The document formalises cooperation in aviation and radar surveillance technologies.

• In March 2025, SAAB concluded a memorandum with the Ukrainian company Radionix on joint development and servicing of sensors, optical sighting equipment and defence electronics.

4. Unmanned systems and innovation
SAAB is actively interested in joint production of unmanned aircraft, combining its technologies with Ukraine's unique combat experience. The company also signed an agreement with the Kyiv School of Economics (KSE) to develop joint research (R&D) in UAVs and microelectronics.

5. Current operation of equipment
Ukraine is already an active user of the SAAB ecosystem. Anti-tank weapons (NLAW, AT4, Carl-Gustaf), Giraffe radars and RBS 70 NG MANPADS are widely used on the battlefield. In addition, in September 2026 the operational use by the Ukrainian Air Force of SAAB ASC 890 (AEW&C) airborne early-warning and control aircraft was confirmed, which significantly strengthen Ukrainian air defence capabilities.

Summary:
SAAB Group's strategy regarding Ukraine is long-term. The company views Ukraine not simply as a sales market or aid recipient, but as a strategic partner whose combat experience and industrial potential will help strengthen SAAB's own position in the global defence technology market.

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Sources:
1. https://www.airdatanews.com/saab-signs-cooperation-agreement-with-ukrainian-defense-industry/
2. https://techukraine.org
3. https://militarnyi.com/en/news/saab-plans-to-set-up-production-in-ukraine/
4. https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2025/05/23/7513733/
5. https://envantermedya.com/en/saab-16-gripen-e-fighter-jets-ukraine/
6. https://www.saab.com/newsroom/press-releases/2026/saab-signs-contract-for-gripen-e-for-ukraine
7. https://migflug.com
8. https://forbes.ua/news/shvedska-saab-khoche-viroblyati-sistemi-ppo-v-ukraini-v-mezhakh-initsiativi-build-in-ukraine-22102025-33549
9. https://en.defence-ua.com/news/saab_to_launch_air_defense_production_in_ukraine_could_aid_gripen_jet_manufacturing-16242.html
10. https://www.saab.com/uk-UA/markets/ukraine/news/saab-and-joint-stock-company-ukrainian-defense-industry-sign-memorandum-of-understanding
11. https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-economy/4091380-spivpraca-iz-saab-pidsilit-aviavirobnictvo-ukroboronpromu-smetanin.html
12. https://epravda.com.ua/oborona/saab-spivpracyuvatime-z-radionix-804294/
13. https://www.ukrinform.net/rubric-economy/4050396-ukrainian-president-saab-leadership-discuss-joint-drone-production.html
14. https://www.saab.com/uk-UA/markets/ukraine
15. https://militarnyi.com/uk/news/ukrayina-ta-saab-pidpysaly-memorandum-pro-spivpratsyu-u-sferi-aviatsiyi-ta-rls/
16. https://www.janes.com/defence-intelligence-insights/defence-news/c4isr/ukraine-conflict-kyiv-confirms-use-of-asc-890-aewc-aircraft
17. https://defence-industry.eu/ukraine-and-sweden-expand-cooperation-on-gripen-jets-air-defence-and-military-technology-projects/

Swedish air defence (AD) systems and radars from SAAB have proven themselves excellently in real combat conditions in Ukraine. Their main advantage is high technological sophistication, resistance to enemy jamming and the ability to work in a unified information network.

Here is how exactly the RBS 70 and Giraffe radars have performed against drones and cruise missiles:
1. RBS 70 MANPADS / short-range SAM
The RBS 70 (and its latest variants) has become one of the most effective short-range (VSHORAD) assets for destroying Russian cruise missiles and unmanned aircraft (from ZALA reconnaissance drones and Lancet strike drones to Shahed-type kamikaze drones).

Why it is so effective:

• Laser guidance (beam riding): Unlike the Stinger or Igla, which home in on the target's heat emission, the RBS 70 missile flies within a laser beam created by the operator. This makes the system absolutely immune to heat decoys and electronic warfare (EW) assets.

• Versatile BOLIDE missile: It reaches a speed of up to Mach 2 (about 2,450 km/h) and has an engagement range of up to 9 km (altitude up to 5 km). The warhead has a combined effect (fragmentation and shaped-charge), which reliably destroys both small drones and armoured targets (for example, Ka-52 attack helicopters).

• Night operation: A thermal sight allows effective shooting down of Shaheds and missiles during night attacks.
2. Giraffe family of radars
Giraffe radars (various versions have been supplied to Ukraine, including the Giraffe 75 / PS-90 from Sweden and the Giraffe Mk IV from Ireland) act as the "eyes" of air defence systems. Modern versions, such as Giraffe 1X, are specially optimised for countering unmanned aircraft (C-UAS).

Advantages of Giraffe radars against drones and missiles:

• Detection of LSS targets (Low, Slow, Small): Giraffe radars have special algorithms (Enhanced Drone Tracker) for detecting low-flying, slow and low-signature targets, such as drones made of plastic or composite materials.

• High data refresh rate: The radar antenna updates the air picture every second (a 360-degree rotation in 1 second). This is critically important for tracking fast cruise missiles or manoeuvring drones.

• Multifunctionality: They can simultaneously track dozens of targets at a distance of 50 to 100 km (depending on the variant) and also detect mortar or artillery fire (C-RAM function).
Synergy: how they work together
The greatest effectiveness of Swedish weapons is revealed in combination. A Giraffe radar detects a cruise missile or a swarm of Shaheds at a distance of 50–75 km. It automatically passes the target coordinates to the control console.

The RBS 70 operator receives target designation directly in the headset (the pitch of the sound changes depending on the target's position) and on a display. This allows the MANPADS crew to aim in advance at the required sector of the sky, acquire the target immediately after it appears in the line of sight and destroy it reliably with the laser-guided missile.

Summary: Swedish systems have proven to be among the most adapted to modern threats. The RBS 70 provides 100% resistance to EW during interception, and Giraffe radars make it possible to see even the smallest kamikaze drones long before they approach the target. In addition, Sweden is now integrating 40 mm anti-aircraft automatic guns into the same network Tridon Mk 2 (with programmable ammunition), which makes this layered short-range air defence system even more lethal to drones.

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Sources:
1. https://defence-ua.com/news/saab_dlja_pzrk_rbs_70_scho_vikoristovuje_zsu_rozrobiv_novu_raketu_bolide_2_bilsh_smertonosnu_ta_efektivnishu-22893.html
2. https://2plus2.ua/groshi/novyny/mobilnist-ta-lazerna-tochnist-shvedskiy-zrk-rbs-70-zmicnyue-oboronu-ukraini
3. https://today.ua
4. https://www.rbc.ua/ukr/news/ukrayina-otrimala-shvedski-zhirafi-proti-1782289429.html
5. https://www.5.ua/suspilstvo/yakshcho-vin-bachyt-tsil-vona-bude-urazhena-iak-shvedskyi-pzrk-rbs-70-zakhyshchaie-ukrainske-nebo-siuzhet-308686.html
6. https://espreso.tv/oborona-ta-bezpeka-pershiy-u-sviti-pzrk-z-lazernim-navedennyam-rozpovidaemo-pro-shvedskiy-rbs-70-yakim-zsu-zbivae-rosiyski-gelikopteri-ta-ne-tilki
7. https://militarnyi.com/uk/articles/rbs-70-shvedskyj-pzrk-iz-lazernym-navedennyam-yakyj-zahyshhaye-nebo-ukrayiny/
8. https://armyinform.com.ua/2022/11/08/u-chomu-universalnist-shvedskogo-pzrk-rbs-70/
9. https://nv.ua
10. https://militarnyi.com/uk/news/na-ozbroyenni-ukrayiny-z-yavylys-shvedski-rls-giraffe-75/
11. https://www.saab.com/products/giraffe-1x
12. https://defensehere.com
13. https://www.unian.ua/weapons/ppo-dlya-ukrajini-shveciya-litva-ta-irlandiya-postavlyat-ukrajini-potuzhnu-sistemu-na-milyoni-dolariv-12927882.html
14. https://lb.ua/world/2025/03/04/663777_shvedskiy_paket_ppo_partneri.html

The modern war in Ukraine has recently become a "war of thermal imagers". Because of the total saturation of the battlefield with reconnaissance drones (Mavic 3T, Zala, Supercam), FPV strike drones with thermal cameras, as well as aviation (Ka-52) and ATGMs, traditional visual camouflage (paint, branches, ordinary nets) has lost its effectiveness. Armoured vehicles that are operating generate an enormous amount of heat (engine, exhaust system, armour heated by sun or firing), which makes them an ideal target.

To survive, Ukrainian armoured vehicles critically need multispectral camouflage systems (Multispectral Camouflage). They work in several bands at once: visual, near-infrared (against night-vision devices), thermal (against thermal imagers) and radar (against radars).

Here are the systems the Armed Forces of Ukraine need, which are already in use and which are being developed in Ukraine:
1. Western benchmarks (what the AFU already partly has)

• Saab Barracuda MCS (Sweden): This is the absolute gold standard in the world. The Mobile Camouflage System (MCS) is not just a cover but a multilayer material tailored individually to the contours of each vehicle. It reduces thermal emission, dissipates engine heat, breaks up the silhouette and absorbs radio waves. The AFU already use the Barracuda on transferred Swedish CV90 IFVs, Leopard 2A6 tanks and Archer self-propelled howitzers.

• BCB International ATMIS / MSC (United Kingdom): The British company is actively supplying its multispectral systems to Ukraine. Its new development, ATMIS (Adaptive Tactical Multispectral Integrated Systems), consists of lightweight, durable panels that attach to equipment and reduce its signature in the visible, IR and thermal spectra.

• Fibrotex (Israel/USA): Manufacturer of advanced mobile camouflage systems used by the US and Israeli armies. They are double-sided (for example, forest/urban) and block thermal emission very well.
2. Ukrainian developments (import substitution)
Since Western systems are expensive and will not be enough for thousands of vehicles, Ukraine is actively developing its own solutions:


• MCS "Luska" (from SASS Military / ProBaza): A Ukrainian mobile camouflage system for vehicles and armoured equipment. It works in three spectra (visual, IR, thermal) and is able to block up to 80% of thermal emission. The system has a modular design ("scales"), which allows a damaged part to be quickly replaced in the field.

• STG Defence (Stealth system): A Ukrainian company that develops multispectral shelters for fixed positions (self-propelled howitzers, MLRS, command posts), as well as individual anti-thermal-imaging ponchos for infantry that work using "Stealth" technology.

• Developments by Ukraine's MoD: The MoD, together with volunteers and scientists, constantly tests new samples of anti-thermal-imaging fabrics (metallised polymers, microfibres), which are compared in effectiveness with the Saab Barracuda itself.
3. What does the enemy use?
The Russians also understand this problem. They are widely using, on their modern tanks (T-90M "Proryv", T-80BVM), the "Nakidka" system (a radar-absorbing and thermally insulating material). In addition, Russia is testing polyurethane mastics such as "Teplosfera", with which equipment is coated to reduce temperature contrast. Therefore Ukraine needs parity or superiority in this area.
Main requirements for camouflage systems for Ukrainian armoured vehicles:
For a system to be effective in the realities of the Ukrainian front, it must meet strict criteria:

1. Thermoregulation and ventilation: A tank or self-propelled howitzer is a furnace. If you simply cover the vehicle with a thermal insulator (as in a thermos), the engine will quickly overheat and fail. A modern system must have special ventilation channels and materials that dissipate exhaust heat by mixing it with cold air so as not to create a bright spot for the thermal imager.
2. Modularity and survivability: Vehicles constantly drive through tree lines, forests and the ruins of towns, and are hit by fragments. Camouflage must be modular (made up of panels or squares). If a branch tears off a piece of camouflage, the crew must be able to attach a new fragment in 5 minutes rather than change the whole cover.
3. Protection against AI (artificial intelligence): Modern drones are equipped with machine vision (AI detection). Camouflage must not only hide heat but also break up the vehicle's geometric outlines (turret, barrel, tracks) so that the drone's algorithm cannot recognise a tank in this blob.
4. Mass availability and affordability: The AFU need camouflage not only for scarce tanks but also for artillery, air defence systems, EW vehicles, Starlink terminals and ordinary logistics pickups, which enemy FPV drones hunt.

Summary: The presence of systems like the Barracuda or its Ukrainian analogues is today as important a component of armoured vehicle survival as reactive armour (ERA) or EW systems. In modern war the rule applies: *"If you are seen, you are destroyed."* Multispectral camouflage breaks this chain at the detection stage.

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Sources:
1. https://www.youtube.com/s/desktop/71381699/img/favicon.ico
2. https://www.ukrainianworldcongress.org/invisibility-cloak-ukraines-defense-ministry-tests-new-invention/
3. https://www.joint-forces.com/kit-camo/76541-multi-spectral-camouflage-a-game-changer
4. https://www.calibredefence.co.uk/wescom-defence-launches-atmis-a-camouflage-system-for-vehicles-and-containers/
5. https://probaza.com.ua/ua/p2088801109-mobilnaya-kamuflyazhnaya-sistema.html
6. https://stg-defence.com
7. https://www.ukr.net/news/details/technologies/102862745.html
8. https://defence-ua.com/news/rashisti_pochali_aktivnishe_vikoristovuvati_termokamufljazhni_plaschi_jaki_dozvoljajut_maskuvatisja_vid_teplovizora-11381.html
9. https://militarnyi.com/uk/news/rosiyany-rozrobyly-sposib-maskuvannya-tehniky-vid-teplovizoriv/
10. https://galychyna.if.ua/wp-content/themes/galychyna/style.css
11. https://united24media.com/war-in-ukraine/how-drone-warfare-is-forcing-ukraine-to-rethink-military-uniforms-15696

The anti-tank missile systems NLAW (Next Generation Light Anti-tank Weapon), of Swedish-British manufacture, played one of the most important roles in defending Ukraine, especially in the initial stage of the full-scale Russian invasion. Their appearance in the Ukrainian Armed Forces' arsenal became a real "game changer" on the battlefield.
The role of the NLAW in the war in Ukraine
1. Breaking the Russian blitzkrieg (spring 2022)
The United Kingdom began mass supply of NLAWs to Ukraine in January 2022, a few weeks before the invasion. When Russian armoured columns tried to advance quickly along roads in the Kyiv, Chernihiv and Sumy directions, the NLAWs became the ideal weapon for ambushes. According to Ukrainian military estimates, in the first phase of the war these systems accounted for up to 30–40% of all destroyed Russian armour.

2. An ideal weapon for urban combat and ambushes
The NLAW has a "soft launch" system — the missile leaves the tube using an ejection charge and only ignites the sustainer motor in the air. This allowed Ukrainian soldiers to fire safely directly from building windows, basements or enclosed spaces, which made the system indispensable in urban areas.

3. Hitting the most vulnerable spot
The system has an OTA (Overfly Top Attack) mode. The missile flies a metre above the tank and, using a magnetic sensor, detonates the shaped charge exactly above the turret roof — where the armour is thinnest. The grilles welded on by the Russians ("cope cages") proved completely ineffective against this weapon.
Reputation among Ukrainian military personnel
The NLAW's reputation among Armed Forces of Ukraine soldiers is exceptionally positive, and the system has acquired legendary status. Military personnel highlight several main advantages:


• Simplicity and speed of training: Military personnel note that the NLAW can be mastered at a basic level in just a few hours or days (unlike more complex systems). It did not require lengthy training, which was critically important in the chaos of the first days of the big war.

• The "perfect pair" with the Javelin: Ukrainian anti-tank crews developed an effective tactic — using the NLAW and the American Javelin in pairs. The Javelin was used in open terrain against targets at 1–2.5 km, while the NLAW worked ideally at close range (from 20 to 600–800 metres) and in forest or urban conditions.

• Mobility: The system weighs only 12.5 kg. This made it possible to create highly mobile anti-tank groups. There are known cases where Ukrainian soldiers mounted NLAW containers on Ukrainian silent electric bikes (for example, Delfast), quickly rode to a position, destroyed a target and instantly vanished.

• The "fire and forget" principle: The operator does not need to guide the missile with a laser or wire all the way to the target. After pulling the trigger, the soldier could immediately take cover, which saved the lives of many infantrymen.
Current status (as of 2024–2026)
As the war has developed, the nature of combat has changed substantially. Today the lion's share of tasks of destroying enemy armour has been taken over by FPV strike drones, which can hit targets at much greater distances (10–20 km and more) at a much lower price.

Nevertheless, the NLAW has not lost its relevance at all. It remains a reliable "last line" of infantry anti-tank defence. If enemy equipment breaks through the artillery, minefield and drone kill zones and approaches the trenches, the NLAW gives the infantryman a guaranteed ability to destroy any Russian tank at short range.

Overall, the NLAW has gone down in the history of the Armed Forces of Ukraine as a weapon that helped save the capital and break the plans of the Russian offensive, and the phrase "God Save the Queen" (as a sign of gratitude to Britain) became a popular saying among Ukrainian military personnel in 2022.

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Sources:
1. https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/zbroia-dlia-ukrainy-proty-rosii/31666136.html
2. https://hmarochos.kiev.ua/2022/05/18/vijskovi-vstanovlyuyut-na-elektrobajky-delfast-rakety-nlaw/
3. https://www.youtube.com/s/desktop/71381699/img/favicon.ico
4. https://forbes.ua/inside/vid-javelin-do-himars-yaku-zakhidnu-zbroyu-otrimala-ukraina-za-chas-viyni-ta-chomu-tsogo-nedostatno-18082022-7783
5. https://historynet.com/nlaw-missile/
6. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NLAW
7. https://sprotyvg7.com.ua
8. https://armyinform.com.ua/2022/01/21/shho-vazhlyvo-znaty-pro-nlaw-ta-chomu-czej-ptrk-nazyvayut-ostannim-rubezhem-protytankovoyi-oborony/
9. https://texty.org.ua/fragments/106264/yak-zsu-zastosovuyut-korsar-nlaw-i-javelin-rozpovid-operatora-ptrk/
10. https://defence-ua.com/news/komu_azh_dva_roki_znadobilosja_schob_nareshti_vpershe_zamoviti_legendarni_nlaw_jaki_garno_nischat_tanki_rashistiv-23391.html
11. https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-ato/3450272-nlaw-i-javelin-najkrase-zastosovuvati-u-pari-recept-ukrainskih-vijskovih.html
12. https://ain.ua/2022/05/17/delfast-peredaye-elektrobajki-zsu/
13. https://www.saab.com/markets/united-kingdom/stories/ukraine-a-crucible-for-modern-warfare-and-the-enduring-relevance-of-the-nlaw

Against the backdrop of a protracted war and the need to restore equipment quickly, a number of leading European defence companies have already opened or are actively rolling out their production and service hubs directly in Ukraine. This makes it possible to significantly shorten the logistics leg for repairs and strengthen Ukraine's military-industrial complex.

Here are the main European defence giants localising their activity in Ukraine (as of 2026):

1. Rheinmetall (Germany)

• Status: Already operating and expanding.

• Details: In October 2023, the joint venture *Rheinmetall Ukrainian Defense Industry LLC* was created. In June 2024, the first workshop for repair and maintenance of armoured vehicles (including Marder IFVs, and later Leopard 1 and Leopard 2 tanks) officially started operating in western Ukraine. In addition, the company is building a plant in Ukraine to produce 155 mm artillery ammunition (the site for construction was allocated in early 2026) and plans to localise production of armoured vehicles (for example, the Lynx IFV).

2. BAE Systems (United Kingdom)

• Status: Already operating.

• Details: The British giant opened an office in Kyiv back in August 2023. The company signed agreements on localising production and repair of its weapons (in particular the lightweight L119 howitzers). BAE Systems is cooperating with local enterprises to create hubs for servicing equipment that Britain has transferred (M777 howitzers, CV90 IFVs, Challenger 2 tanks, etc.).

3. KNDS (France/Germany)

• Status: Already operating.

• Details: The manufacturer of Leopard tanks and CAESAR self-propelled howitzers opened a subsidiary, *KNDS Ukraine LLC
•, in Kyiv in October 2024. In early 2025, a joint venture for maintenance and repair of equipment (Leopard, CAESAR, PzH 2000, Gepard, AMX-10 RC) was launched. KNDS also plans to produce 155 mm ammunition and spare parts together with Ukrainian industry.

4. SAAB (Sweden)

• Status: In the process of negotiation and planning.

• Details: Against the backdrop of preparations for a possible large-scale supply of JAS 39 Gripen fighters to Ukraine (a contract for 100–150 aircraft is being discussed), SAAB's management has stated the need to expand production. The company is considering creating a new production centre for Ukraine's needs. Although various locations are being considered (including Canada as a production hub for the Ukrainian Air Force), SAAB is actively cooperating with Ukraine on technical expectations and future servicing of the aircraft.

5. Thales (France)

• Status: In the process of being rolled out.

• Details: The company signed memoranda on creating a joint venture in Ukraine that will deal with repair and modernisation of electronic warfare equipment, communications, air defence systems and radars. Also, at the end of 2024, Thales (in particular its Belgian division) agreed with Ukraine on joint production of missiles to counter enemy drones.

6. Leonardo (Italy)

• Status: Legal entity registered in 2026.

• Details: In May 2026, the Italian giant registered a subsidiary in Ukraine (through *Leonardo International*). The office will focus on research, experimental development and cooperation with Ukraine's drone industry. The company also plans to test its latest AI-based air defence system, Michelangelo Dome, in Ukraine.

7. Babcock (United Kingdom)

• Status: Already operating.

• Details: The company created an engineering hub in Ukraine together with "Ukrainian Defence Industry" (UDI) to support military vehicles and armoured equipment. Babcock is also servicing the Sandown-class minehunters transferred to Ukraine and is introducing 3D-printing of military spare parts directly on site for rapid repair.

Other notable players:

• Quantum-Systems (Germany): Opened a plant for producing reconnaissance drones and a development centre in Ukraine in April 2024.

• Flensburger Fahrzeugbau Gesellschaft (FFG) (Germany): Is creating a repair hub for restoring Leopard 1 tanks and other engineering equipment.

These steps testify to the gradual integration of Ukraine's defence industry into the European defence ecosystem and a transition from a "supply only" format to a "joint production and on-site servicing" format.

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Sources:
1. https://www.rheinmetall.com/en/media/stories/2026/rheinmetall-a-powerful-partner-at-ukraine-side
2. https://oboronka.mezha.ua/en/ukrajina-ta-rheinmetall-remont-viyskovoji-tehniki-305830/
3. https://www.rheinmetall.com/en/media/news-watch/news/2024/06/2024-06-11-rheinmetall-ukrainian-defense-industry-repair-hub
4. https://www.ukrinform.net/rubric-economy/4080224-ukraine-allocates-new-site-for-rheinmetall-ammunition-plant.html
5. https://www.ukrinform.net/rubric-economy/3716205-ukraine-is-ready-to-become-major-regional-hub-for-british-bae-systems-zelensky.html
6. https://militarnyi.com/en/news/bae-systems-expands-weapons-production-in-ukraine-zelensky/
7. https://www.iss.europa.eu/publications/briefs/made-ukraine-how-eu-can-support-ukrainian-defence-production
8. https://www.globalbankingandfinance.com/uk-discloses-four-maintenance-facilities-operating-ukraine/
9. https://kyivindependent.com/massive-explosion-rocks-italian-ammunition-plant-that-produces-artillery-for-ukraine/
10. https://dsm.forecastinternational.com/2024/10/02/knds-opens-kyiv-subsidiary-to-bolster-ukrainian-military-support/
11. https://defence-industry.eu/knds-deutschland-and-ukrainian-defence-firm-launch-joint-venture/
12. https://en.interfax.com.ua/news/general/1098221.html
13. https://nordicdefencesector.com/en/article/saab-signs-agreement-for-16-gripen-e-to-ukraine
14. https://en.defence-ua.com/news/saab_assesses_possibility_of_creating_new_gripen_production_center_for_ukraine-16263.html
15. https://militarnyi.com/en/news/20-to-30-gripen-per-year-and-production-expansion-saab-shared-plans-for-ukraine/
16. https://breakingdefense.com
17. https://www.globaldefensecorp.com/2025/10/31/saab-selects-canada-as-gripen-manufacturing-hub-for-ukrainian-air-force/
18. https://thalesgroup.com
19. https://stopwapenhandel.org/we-should-prevent-that-ukraine-becomes-an-arms-hub/
20. https://uawire.org
21. https://thedefender.media
22. https://uatv.ua/en/zelenskyy-ukraine-shares-battlefield-feedback-with-italian-arms-makers-says-joint-ukrainian-italian-production-is-up-and-running/
23. https://naval-technology.com
24. https://defence-industry.eu/babcock-ramps-up-uk-military-support-to-ukraine/
25. https://3dprintingindustry.com/news/babcock-to-support-3d-printing-of-military-parts-for-ukraine-under-the-latest-mod-contract-238462/

The Swedish defence company SAAB Group is actively expanding its strategic partnership with Ukraine. Under the government's "Build in Ukraine" programme and memoranda with JSC "Ukrainian Defence Industry" (Ukroboronprom), the company is ready to localise production and jointly develop a range of modern technologies and types of weapons.

The main areas of cooperation cover the following types of weapons and technologies:

1. Air defence (AD) systems
In October 2025, Ukraine's Ministry of Defence and SAAB officially agreed on joint production of air defence systems on Ukrainian territory. The company's portfolio under consideration for localisation and for the needs of the Armed Forces of Ukraine includes:

• RBS 70 NG — modern man-portable air-defence systems (MANPADS) with laser guidance, resistant to enemy electronic warfare.

• MSHORAD — highly mobile short-range air defence systems designed to protect ground units from drones, helicopters and cruise missiles.

• Giraffe family radars (in particular Giraffe 1X, AMB, 4A) — multifunctional radars capable of detecting low-signature aerial targets.

2. Aviation (JAS-39 Gripen fighters)
SAAB CEO Micael Johansson has stated the company's readiness to open in Ukraine a facility for final assembly, testing and possibly partial production of parts for multirole fighters JAS-39 Gripen. This step is being considered in the context of Ukraine's long-term intention to buy from 100 to 150 such aircraft, which are ideally suited to Ukrainian conditions (in particular, thanks to the ability to take off from ordinary roads and lower maintenance requirements).

3. Radar surveillance, sensors and electronics
In February 2026, SAAB and Ukroboronprom signed a memorandum of cooperation in aviation and airborne surveillance technologies. In addition, back in spring 2025, SAAB concluded an agreement with the Ukrainian company Radionix on a strategic partnership in developing advanced sensors and defence electronics.

4. Unmanned systems and ammunition components
SAAB's management has also expressed interest in jointly developing and producing unmanned aerial vehicles, as well as in manufacturing ammunition components at the facilities of Ukrainian enterprises.

Cooperation with SAAB involves not only large-unit assembly of equipment but also gradual technology transfer, training of Ukrainian engineers and deep integration of Ukraine's military-industrial complex into the European defence ecosystem.

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Sources:
1. https://forbes.ua/news/shvedska-saab-khoche-viroblyati-sistemi-ppo-v-ukraini-v-mezhakh-initsiativi-build-in-ukraine-22102025-33549
2. https://www.saab.com/newsroom/press-releases/2026/saab-and-joint-stock-company-ukrainian-defense-industry-sign-memorandum-of-understanding
3. https://www.unian.ua/weapons/saab-ppo-ukrajina-i-shvedska-kompaniya-domovilisya-pro-spilne-virobnictvo-ozbroyennya-13171665.html
4. https://www.ukr.net/news/details/technologies/114160944.html
5. https://armyrecognition.com
6. https://militarnyi.com/en/news/saab-to-jointly-produce-air-defense-systems-with-ukraine/
7. https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-economy/4051952-saab-gotova-vidkriti-v-ukraini-zavod-iz-virobnictva-litakiv-gripen.html
8. https://hromadske.ua/viyna/253740-shvedska-kompaniia-saab-hotova-vidkryty-zavod-zi-skladannia-litakiv-gripen-v-ukrayini
9. https://ain.ua/2025/10/27/saab-moze-vidkriti-v-ukrayini-zavod-z-virobnictva-vinishhuvaciv-gripen/
10. https://biz.liga.net/ua/all/news/shvedskyy-oboronnyy-hihant-planuie-vyrobliaty-systemy-ppo-v-ukraini
11. https://mind.ua/news/20279372-shvedska-saab-planue-nalagoditi-virobnictvo-zbroyi-v-ukrayini
12. https://defence24.com/industry/saab-to-launch-air-defence-systems-production-in-ukraine